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ABSTRACT: 
Suppressed Anger, Retaliation Doctrine, and Workplace Culture is an 
interdisciplinary piece combining legal analysis with organizational 
behavior/psychology research.  Suppressed Anger examines and critiques 
two employment law doctrines on retaliation—the “reasonable belief” 
doctrine and, what we call, the “manner of the complaint” doctrine.  We 
argue that beyond hindering employees’ rights as has been examined in prior 
scholarship, the law in this area also does a significant disservice to 
employers by inhibiting emotion expression and thereby negatively affecting 
workplace culture and productivity.  The “reasonable belief” doctrine 
essentially dictates that for retaliatory conduct to be unlawful, the 
complaining party must have an objectively reasonable belief that the 
practices he or she opposed were unlawful, basing the assessment of 
reasonableness on whether a court would find the practices to be unlawful 
discrimination.  The “manner of the complaint” doctrine arises in cases in 
which an employer deems the manner of the employee’s complaint regarding 
discriminatory practices to be insubordinate and fires the employee on that 
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basis.  In these cases, courts rarely question an employer’s claim of 
insubordination, ignoring the circumstances that gave rise to the complaint 
and focusing solely on the employer’s subjective belief that the employee’s 
demeanor was unacceptable.  The result of both doctrines, we argue, is a 
legal framework that incentivizes employees to stay quiet and refrain from 
making any complaints. 
This Article breaks new ground by drawing on existing scholarship in 
the psychology and organizational behavior field detailing the negative 
outcomes when employees suppress anger and other emotions in the 
workplace, particularly in response to perceived injustice.  We use this 
research to argue that retaliation doctrine inhibits the useful airing of 
problems that require management attention.  Instead existing precedents 
foment worker dissatisfaction and can lead to psychological and 
physiological issues for individual employees that negatively impact the 
workplace as a whole.  As a result, we maintain that changing retaliation 
doctrine should not be a goal of workers alone but that employers, upon 
examining the research on expressions of anger in the workplace, should find 
common ground with their employees. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In March 2015, a former Google engineer tweeted the following 
statement: “Rod Chavez is an engineering director at Google, he sexually 
harassed me, Google did nothing about it.  Reprimanded me instead of him.”1  
Kelly Ellis explained the circumstances in a series of tweets throughout the 
day, describing inappropriate comments by the engineering director and 
others.  Ultimately, she “reacted badly to something he said and ended up 
pouring a drink over his head.”2  Rather than take her complaints of sexual 
harassment seriously, Ellis alleged that Human Resources focused on the 
“humiliation” suffered by the director as a result of being soaked by the 
drink.3  In a stark description of the situation she faced, Ellis tweeted: “My 
choices were: speak up loudly, lose my job, burn bridges . . . , leave 
quietly . . ., or not say anything.”4  She had earlier tweeted the following: “I 
wonder how many other women don’t report or discuss their harassment, for 
their careers’ sake.”5 
The choice Ellis eventually made, to leave on her own and then speak 
up about the behavior online, is becoming a more common one in the tech 
world.6  In February 2017, a former Uber engineer left her job at Uber and 
then wrote a lengthy blog post alleging sexual harassment and other forms 
of sex discrimination by her former employer and a massive failure on the 
part of Human Resources to investigate or take any action in response.7  But 
 
 1.  Mark Wilson, Google hit with sexual harassment complaint from ex-employee, 
BETANEWS (Mar. 8, 2015), https://betanews.com/2015/03/08/google-sexual-harassment/ 
[https://perma.cc/D82A-LVVH]. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. See also Rob Price, A former Google employee claims she was reprimanded for 
speaking out about sexual harassment, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.bus
inessinsider.com/kelly-ellis-claims-she-was-sexually-harassed-at-google-2015-3 
[https://perma.cc/X9P9-6MQZ ] (detailing the circumstances surrounding tweets sent out by 
a former Google employee who left the company after her complaints of sexual harassment 
were ignored and used against her). 
 4.  Wilson, supra note 1. 
 5.  Id. (quoting – Kelly Ellis (@justkelly_ok) Jan. 22, 2015). 
 6.  Klint Finley, Tech Still Doesn’t Take Discrimination Seriously, WIRED (Feb. 20, 
2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/tech-still-doesnt-take-discrimination-seriously/ [http
s: // perma.cc/8NS9-S58C]. 
 7.  Susan J. Fowler, Reflecting On One Very, Very Strange Year At Uber, SUSAN J. 
FOWLER BLOG (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.susanjfowler.com/blog/2017/2/19/reflecting-on-
one-very-strange-year-at-uber [https://perma.cc/QHR6-F48E].  See Sam Levin, Female 
engineer sues Tesla, describing a culture of ‘pervasive harassment’, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/feb/28/tesla-female-engineer-lawsuit-
harassment-discrimination?CMP=oth_b-aplnews_d-1 [https://perma.cc/9W9V-7LL6] (discu
ssing a current Tesla engineer who is suing company for sexual harassment and other sex 
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this choice is not limited to tech workplaces, to those alleging sexual 
harassment, or to women.  And it is not new.  The risk that complaining about 
discriminatory comments will end one’s career and leave little legal recourse 
is a reality for many workers.  The fear that management will retaliate against 
the employee for his complaint or focus on his anger in response to the 
discrimination rather than the discrimination itself incentivizes workers to 
suppress those emotions and ignore the problem.  But the problem rarely 
ends with that worker.  In fact, the overly narrow legal protections available 
in such cases serve to incentivize workers to stay quiet (or leave and speak 
up online later), thereby damaging the entire workplace culture. 
Consider this scenario: James, a long-term employee, approaches his 
Human Resources representative to complain about a horribly offensive 
comment made by his supervisor in the workplace.  The comment is race-
related and to James’s ears (and to many people), it is outright racist.  James 
is visibly distressed, cannot imagine working with the supervisor after this 
incident, and wants action taken against the speaker.  The Human Resources 
representative agrees that the comment is unacceptable in the workplace, 
promises some action, and follows up by approaching the supervisor to ask 
about the incident.  The supervisor, in turn, claims that James misheard or 
misinterpreted the comment and that it is simply “not as bad” as James is 
making it sound.  But, he promises to follow up with James to “smooth things 
over.”  This meeting, as one might imagine, goes horribly wrong, ending in 
even greater tension between the supervisor and employee.  Three weeks 
later, when upper management begins to put pressure on the supervisor to 
cut costs, he takes the opportunity to terminate James who is not nearly as 
effective as he had been in the past and who he now feels uncomfortable 
supervising.  The supervisor consults with Human Resources and feels 
comfortable proceeding with the termination because he understands that it 
is highly unlikely that any court will uphold a retaliation claim under these 
circumstances. 
After his termination, James returns to his desk to collect his personal 
items before leaving the building.  His co-workers see him packing up and 
learn that he has been fired.  Some of these co-workers knew of James’s 
complaint to Human Resources or, at the very least, knew of his tense 
 
discrimination and claiming retaliation for her complaints).  Fowler’s blog post and other 
sexual harassment and discrimination complaints ultimately led Uber to undertake a massive 
internal investigation that resulted in the termination of twenty employees, the production of 
a thirteen-page report of recommended changes to the company culture, and the resignation 
of Uber’s CEO Travis Kalanick.  Mike Isaac, Uber Fires 20 Amid Investigation Into 
Workplace Culture, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2017); Uber Report: Eric Holder’s 
Recommendations for Change, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017); Mike Isaac, Uber Founder Travis 
Kalanick Resigns as C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2017). 
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conversation with the supervisor.  Several employees make the assumption 
that James was fired as a result of his complaint.  Concluding that the incident 
is over and no good can come from re-hashing it, neither management nor 
Human Resources ever raises it again and neither takes any action against 
the supervisor.  The lower-level employees are left to talk among themselves 
about this sequence of events.  Six months later, the same supervisor makes 
offensive comments about women.  This time, despite being deeply upset, 
not a single employee comes forward to complain to management or Human 
Resources.  Instead, employees talk to one another, becoming more upset as 
they re-tell the story.  Management notices increasing tension between the 
supervisor and his employees but cannot get anyone to explain it.  After 
several months, the department’s output begins to drop, several key 
employees quit, and management is left wondering what happened. 
Why has this occurred?  How did the existing legal doctrine on 
workplace discrimination and retaliation contribute to this breakdown in 
workplace health?  And how could the law have helped to prevent it? 
Now imagine if this scenario played out slightly differently.  When 
James initially complains about racially biased comments, he does not go to 
his Human Resources representative but instead complains directly to the 
manager who made the comments.  The manager becomes defensive and 
tells James he is “out of line” and that there is nothing to complain about.  
This further inflames James, who grows increasingly agitated and begins to 
speak loudly and more forcefully, necessitating a call to upper management.  
When a more senior supervisor joins the conversation, James feels attacked 
and continues speaking loudly and angrily.  The senior supervisor views 
James’s demeanor as unacceptable and terminates him on the spot.  When 
James later files suit, claiming discrimination and retaliation for his 
complaint of discrimination, the employer responds that it did not terminate 
James for making the complaint but rather for insubordination.  It was his 
tone and demeanor in making the complaint rather than the substance of it 
that was the problem.  The court accepts this explanation and dismisses the 
retaliation claim on summary judgment. 
Is the court’s conclusion reasonable?  And how does the employer’s 
response to this situation, as supported by the court, impact the rest of its 
employees? 
Deborah Brake, in her groundbreaking piece on retaliation, highlights 
three aspects of the phenomenon that make it an important focus of scholarly 
attention: (1) Retaliation is highly prevalent.  Owing to “social dynamics 
within institutions” and the negative perception of women and people of 
color who complain about discrimination, retaliation is a likely response to 
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such claims.
8
  (2) Retaliation is “powerful medicine, functioning to suppress 
discrimination claims and preserve the social order.”9  The primary reason 
that employees stay quiet instead of speaking up about experiences of 
discrimination is the “[f]ear of retaliation.”10  And (3) an examination of “the 
extent of protection from retaliation found in discrimination law tells us a 
great deal about the scope of discrimination law and the values it protects.”11 
This Article is particularly concerned with two aspects of retaliation 
doctrine illustrated in the previous hypotheticals.  The first is what we refer 
to as the “Reasonable Belief” doctrine, explored in the Supreme Court’s 
2001 decision in Clark County School District v. Breeden.12  The doctrine 
essentially dictates that for retaliatory conduct to be unlawful, the 
complaining party must have an objectively reasonable belief that the 
practices he or she opposed (which, in turn, gave rise to the retaliation) were 
unlawful and that the “reasonableness” of that belief will be based on 
whether a court would find the practices to be unlawful discrimination.13  In 
our first hypothetical scenario, under this doctrine, the employee 
complaining about the offensive race-related comment would likely find his 
complaint unprotected and his termination lawful because under existing 
case law, one biased comment does not create an unlawful hostile work 
environment,14 so it is not “objectively reasonable” to think that one 
comment constitutes unlawful discrimination.15  As a result, a complaint 
about the one comment does not constitute protected activity, making it 
acceptable to terminate the employee as a result of his complaint.16  Despite 
numerous problems with this approach, the doctrine has been adopted by 
every circuit in the country.17 
The second doctrine is one we refer to as the “Manner of the Complaint” 
doctrine and is illustrated in the second hypothetical.  In considering whether 
an employee’s “opposition conduct” is protected, courts often consider the 
 
 8.  Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 20 (2005).  
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 21. 
 12.  532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
 13.  Id. at 270-71; See Satterwhite v. City of Houston, 602 F. App’x 585, 588 (5th Cir. 
2015) (holding that the employee-plaintiff did not have a reasonable belief that his 
supervisor’s comment created a hostile environment and that he could not have had 
reasonably believed that his supervisor’s actions were protected by Title VII). 
 14.  Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271. 
 15.  Id. Satterwhite, 602 F. App’x at 588. 
 16.  Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271. 
 17.  Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The Case for Eliminating the 
Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities Under Title VII’s Anti-
Retaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1129 n.7 (2007).  
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manner in which the complaint was made and claim to weigh employer and 
employee interests in reaching a conclusion about reasonable behavior.18  In 
practice, courts rarely question an employer’s claim of insubordination, 
ignoring the circumstances that gave rise to the complaint, and focusing 
solely on the employer’s subjective belief that the employee’s demeanor was 
unacceptable.19  Wanting to avoid a deep dive into the employer’s workplace 
culture and judgment, courts generally blindly accept the claim of 
insubordination, thus turning it into a “get out of liability free card.” 
These doctrines, while problematic to say the least, are not new and 
come as no surprise to the scholarly community.  A number of scholars, 
including Matthew Green, Craig Senn, Lawrence Rosenthal, Susan Carle, 
and Terry Smith have criticized these doctrines as undermining the goals of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act20 and other anti-discrimination statutes21 and 
the basic need to protect workers who come forward to challenge bias in the 
workplace.22  While we agree with these scholars’ opposition to these 
doctrines and the reasons they cite, this Article takes a different approach.  
By drawing on extensive organizational behavior and psychology research 
on anger in the workplace, and particularly on the dual threshold model 
(DTM) of workplace anger, we present new arguments for a doctrinal 
change. 
We contend that in addition to undermining anti-discrimination 
protections, these retaliation doctrines also negatively impact the overall 
health of workplaces.  Both doctrines have the effect of incentivizing 
workers to suppress their anger and any expressive displays of anger in the 
workplace.  They thus inhibit the useful airing of problems that require 
management attention, instead fomenting worker dissatisfaction and even 
 
 18.  See Susan D. Carle, Angry Employees: Revisiting Insubordination in Title VII Cases, 
10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 185, 208-09 (2016) (discussing court standards of reasonable 
behavior). 
 19.  Id. at 186, 200-09 (“[C]ourts routinely enter judgment in favor of employers where 
the facts show that employees were mildly or moderately insubordinate in reaction to their 
perceptions of discriminatory treatment.”). 
 20.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-17 (2000). 
 21.  See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinafter ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 
621-634 (2000) (ADEA) (prohibiting age discrimination in employment); Americans with 
Disabilities Act (hereinafter ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000) (ADA) (prohibiting 
disability discrimination in employment). 
 22.  See generally Matthew W. Green Jr., What’s So Reasonable About Reasonableness? 
Rejecting a Case Law-Centered Approach to Title VII’s Reasonable Belief Doctrine, 62 KAN. 
L. REV. 759 (2014); Craig Robert Senn, Redefining Protected “Opposition” Activity in 
Employment Retaliation Cases, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2035 (2016); Terry Smith, Everyday 
Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. 
REV. 529 (2003); Rosenthal, supra note 17; Carle, supra note 18. 
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leading to psychological and physiological issues for individual employees 
that negatively impact the workplace as a whole.23  As a result, we maintain 
that changing retaliation doctrine should not be a goal of workers alone but 
that employers, upon examining the research on expressions of anger in the 
workplace should find common ground with their employees.  Although 
creation of healthy and productive workplaces is, by no means, a goal of 
Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes, the pragmatic consequences 
of court-created doctrines should not be ignored.  In fact, consideration of 
the actual impact of these doctrines on worker and workplace health should 
spur support for change among employees and employers alike. 
I.  PROBLEMATIC DOCTRINES 
As illustrated in the introductory hypotheticals, this Article is concerned 
with two court-created doctrines on retaliation—what we have called the 
“Objectively Reasonable Belief” doctrine and the “Manner of the 
Complaint” doctrine.  These doctrines typically arise in the context of 
disparate treatment or “intentional” discrimination cases wherein an 
employee brings a claim of retaliation either in addition to a discrimination 
claim or as a stand-alone claim.24  There is no shortage of such cases in the 
federal courts.  In fact, more retaliation claims are brought than any other 
type of discrimination claim (race, sex, age, disability, etc.).  In 2016, the 
EEOC reported that retaliation charges under all of the federal anti-
discrimination statutes came to 45.9% of all charges.  Retaliation claims 
under Title VII came to 36.2% of all charges, which is still considerably 
 
 23.  We contend that these legal doctrines will continue to inhibit organizations’ well-
meaning attempts to change workplace culture until courts see fit to rethink their approaches 
to retaliation claims.  As long as company attorneys can continue advising management that 
courts will reject both retaliation and discrimination claims, it will be impossible to create 
meaningful change that would, ironically, benefit both employees and employers.  Leora 
Eisenstadt and Deanna Geddes, Anger in the workplace will grow without change in the law, 
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (June 22, 2017), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Anger-in-
the-workplace-will-grow-without-change-11238151.php [https://perma.cc/PF8D-JPHF];  Le
ora Eisenstadt and Deanna Geddes, Risk of employer retaliation must be removed for workers 
who claim discrimination, NEWSWORKS (June 23, 2017), http://www.newsworks.org
/index.php/local/essayworks/104984-op-ed-risk-of-employer-retaliation-must-be-removed-
for-workers-who-claim-discrimination [https://perma.cc/6ZLF-ATRC]. 
 24.  See Jessica Fink, Unintended Consequences: How Antidiscrimination Litigation 
Increases Group Bias in Employer-Defendants, 38 N.M.L. REV. 333, 352 n.87 (citing John 
Sanchez, The Law of Retaliation After Burlington Northern and Garcetti, 30 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 539, 541-42 (2007)) (supporting the proposition that plaintiffs often bring both a 
discrimination claim and a retaliation claim in one action, but that a plaintiff “can recover on 
a retaliation claim even when the court dismisses her underlying [discrimination] claim”). 
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more than any other category.
25
  Retaliation protections are made explicit in 
all of the federal anti-discrimination statutes,26 and retaliation is often 
thought of as itself a form of discrimination.27 
At its core, Title VII provides protection against workplace 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.  As 
part of the historic Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 703(a) of Title VII made 
it unlawful for an employer with fifteen or more employees: 
[T]o fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.28 
 
 25.  U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Charge Statistics (Charges filed 
with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2016, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforc
ement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/Q5FX-XCFC].  There are likely multiple causes of these 
high numbers of retaliation claims including (1) human nature that leads managers to react 
poorly when confronted with claims of discrimination; (2) doctrine that makes it possible to 
prove retaliation without explicit evidence of intentional action; (3) an expansion in recent 
years of who is protected by retaliation protections and when such protections make be 
invoked.  See Thompson v. North American Stainless LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011) (finding that 
Title VII prohibits retaliation against third-party employees who are closely related to the 
employee exercising his or her statutory rights); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 
Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (finding oral complaints to be protected under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act); Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 
Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009) (providing retaliation protection to employees who respond to 
questions during internal investigations); CBOCS West Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 
(2008) (applying retaliation protection to employees who complain about the employer’s 
violation of another employee’s contract-related rights); Alan D. Berkowitz and Leora 
Eisenstadt, The Ever-Expanding World of Retaliation: The Supreme Court Continues the 
Trend, BNA Daily Labor Report (June 2011) (discussing Burlington Northern & Santa Fe 
Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (broadening the definition of “adverse action” for 
retaliation claims)). 
 26.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(d); ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)-(b). 
 27.  See Brake, supra note 8, at 21 (contending that “[r]ecognizing retaliation as a form 
of discrimination, one that is implicitly banned by general proscriptions of discrimination, 
pushes the boundaries of dominant understandings of discrimination in useful and productive 
ways.”); see also Brief of Employment Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 5, Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (No. 
12-484) (contending “[a] long line of cases confirms that when Congress uses the word 
“discriminate” that term encompasses retaliation.”). 
 28.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(3).   
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The statute also very clearly prohibits retaliation for complaining about 
discrimination, opposing discriminatory conduct, and participating in an 
investigation or proceeding under the statute: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for 
employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he 
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner 
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.29 
As a result, the statute makes retaliation protection available for two 
types of conduct: “opposition conduct” and “participation conduct.”30  
“Opposition conduct” includes internal complaints about discriminatory 
conduct regardless of whether the complaint is written or verbal, formal or 
informal, proactively made by an employee or in response to a question by 
management.31  In contrast, “participation conduct” refers specifically to an 
employee’s participation in an investigation by the EEOC, a proceeding in 
court, or the employee’s own filing of charges or suit.32 
Retaliation cases typically play out as follows: An employee believes 
he or she was the victim of discrimination.  The employee then complains to 
a manager or immediately files a charge with the EEOC.  A short time later,33 
the employee is terminated, demoted or faces some other adverse action with 
the employer providing non-discrimination, non-complaint related reasons 
for it if a reason is discussed at all.  The employee then sues, claiming 
retaliation either alone or in addition to a claim of discrimination.  In order 
 
 29.  42 U.S. Code § 2000e–3(a). 
 30.  See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 129 S.Ct. 846, at 
850 (2009) (citing that “[t]he Title VII anti-retaliation provision has two clauses, making it 
‘an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his 
employees . . . [1] because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by this subchapter, or [2] because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.’ 
The one is known as the ‘opposition clause,’ the other as the ‘participation clause.’”). 
 31.  Id. See also Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S.Ct. 1325 at 
15 (finding that the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to a complaint, whether oral or written). 
 32.   See Crawford, 129 S.Ct. 846 at 850 (describing the process by which an employee 
may bring a statutory claim against an employer). 
 33.  The Supreme Court noted that different courts have reached “different conclusions 
regarding how close the timing between the protected activity and the adverse employment 
action must be to establish the causal connection element of the [retaliation] prima facie case.” 
See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Timing Isn’t Everything: Establishing a Title VII Retaliation Pr
ima Facie Case After University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 69 SMU 
L. REV. 143, 152 (2016) (citing opinion in Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 
273 (2001)). 
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to prevail on the retaliation claim, the employee, now plaintiff, must 
demonstrate that he (1) engaged in a statutorily protected activity or 
expression (e.g. a complaint of discrimination); (2) that he suffered an 
adverse action by the employer (e.g. the termination); and (3) that there was 
a causal link between the protected action or expression and the adverse 
action (the short time between complaint and termination often provides this 
causal link without any other evidence of causation).34  Upon demonstration 
of these three factors, the plaintiff has met his prima facie case, and the 
employer has an opportunity to present a legitimate non-retaliatory reason 
for the termination.  Finally, the employee has a chance to demonstrate that 
the legitimate non-retaliatory reason is, in fact, pretext for retaliation.35  For 
our purposes, we must begin by focusing on the first factor in the retaliation 
prima facie case—the protected activity.  Whether the activity or expression 
is protected is the focus of the “Objectively Reasonable Belief” doctrine 
while the form in which the activity or expression emerges (and whether it 
constitutes the true reason for the adverse action) is the focus of the “Manner 
of the Complaint” doctrine.36 
A. The “Objectively Reasonable Belief” Doctrine 
The “Objectively Reasonable Belief” doctrine is best explained by 
consideration of the cases that created and applied the doctrine.  By 
necessity, we begin with the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Clark County 
School District v. Breeden,37 a case with bizarre facts that gave rise to an 
even stranger conclusion.  The case emerged out of a meeting between a 
female employee of the school district, her male supervisor, and another 
male colleague.  The purpose of the meeting was to review psychological 
evaluation reports of several job applicants.38 The report for one of the 
applicants disclosed that the applicant had once made the following comment 
to a co-worker: “I hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand 
 
 34.  Id. See also EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 860 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that “to find a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence: 1) plaintiff engaged in activity protected by Title VII; 2) 
plaintiff’s exercise of his civil rights was known by the defendant; 3) that, thereafter, the 
defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff; and 4) that there was a causal 
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”). 
 35.  See Satterwhite, 602 F. App’x at 587 (explaining the recourse an employee has in 
bringing a claim against a supervisor).   
 36.  See infra Parts I.A and B. 
 37.  532 U.S. 268 (2001).  
 38.  Id. at 269. 
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Canyon.”
39
  The plaintiff’s supervisor read the comment aloud at the meeting 
and stated, “I don’t know what that means,” to which the other male 
employee responded, “Well, I’ll tell you later.”  Then both men chuckled.40  
The plaintiff apparently found this interaction to be highly offensive and 
complained to the offending employee, to the employee’s supervisor, and to 
another management-level employee.41  The plaintiff claimed that she was 
punished for making these complaints.42 
To the casual observer, these facts probably suggest two things: that the 
plaintiff in this case was perhaps overly sensitive to comments of a sexual 
nature and that she did, in fact, make an earnest complaint about perceived 
discriminatory behavior in the workplace.  The Court, however, was not 
sympathetic.  In no more than three paragraphs, the Court dispensed with the 
first factor of the prima facie case, concluding essentially that the plaintiff 
did not demonstrate protected conduct.  The Court began by noting that the 
Ninth Circuit has applied Title VII’s retaliation provision “to protect 
employee ‘opposition’ not just to practices that are actually ‘made . . . 
unlawful’ by Title VII, but also to practices that the employee could 
reasonably believe were unlawful.”43  The Court did not disagree and, in fact 
took no position on this holding, concluding that it had “no occasion to rule 
on the propriety of this interpretation, because even assuming it is correct, 
no one could reasonably believe that the incident recounted above violated 
Title VII.”44 
How did the Court reach this conclusion?  It did not rule that the 
plaintiff in this case did not, in fact, believe there was a violation of Title VII 
or that her complaint was in bad faith.  Instead, the focus of the court’s 
attention was on the objective reasonableness of that belief.  To assess 
reasonableness, the Court considered the underlying incident that led to the 
complaint to determine whether it constituted unlawful discrimination under 
Title VII.  Because the incident involved comments of a sexual nature, the 
Court examined whether these comments amounted to sexual harassment in 
the form of a hostile work environment.45  Noting that “sexual harassment is 
actionable under Title VII only if it is ‘so severe or pervasive as to ‘alter the 
conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working 
environment,’”46 the Court determined that the “isolated incident” involving 
 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 269-70. 
 43.  Id. at 270. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 270-71. 
 46.  Id. (citing Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998)). 
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the sexual comments could not possibly constitute unlawful sexual 
harassment.47  As a result, the Court concluded that “no reasonable person 
could have believed that the single incident recounted above violated Title 
VII’s standard.”48 
The disconnect between the Ninth Circuit’s standard and the Court’s 
approach is subtle, but essential.  Whereas the Ninth Circuit was concerned 
with an average employee’s “reasonable belief” regarding the legality of 
workplace incidents, the Supreme Court in Breeden chose to judge that 
“reasonable belief” by considering how a court would interpret the 
underlying conduct.  Because the standard for finding sexual harassment 
requires a finding of “severe or pervasive” behavior, it concluded that no 
reasonable person could believe that unlawful sexual harassment had 
occurred unless it met this standard.  The average employee, in the Supreme 
Court’s estimation, is aware of the details of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
on discrimination so that he or she knows how to differentiate between 
offensive and inappropriate behavior and actionable discrimination.  That 
employee can then decide about whether to complain because she can 
accurately pinpoint when Title VII has been violated and when it has not.  
This is the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “reasonable belief.”  It was not 
concerned with good faith or sincere belief, nor did it concede that an 
employee untrained in the law might reasonably conflate offensive or biased 
comments with actionable discrimination.  The formula is strange but 
simple:  If a court would determine that the underlying conduct violates Title 
VII, then an average employee may reasonably believe that it does.  And the 
reverse is also true:  If a court would find that the conduct does not constitute 
unlawful discrimination (whether because it is not severe or pervasive or for 
any other reason), an employee who complains about that conduct did so 
unreasonably and thus is unprotected by retaliation protections. 
While the Supreme Court laid out this conclusion in several sentences, 
refusing to elaborate on this novel interpretation, Breeden’s progeny — cases 
in every circuit — have adopted this standard and provided more details on 
its use.49  One of the more recent illustrative cases emerged from the Fifth 
 
 47.  Id. at 271. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  See Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 1129. (stating that while Breeden firmly established 
the “Objectively Reasonable Belief” doctrine later elaborated on by lower courts,  there were 
already district courts relying on similar approaches before the Supreme Court decided the 
case in 2001)  See, e.g., McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:96-CV-0196-CC, 
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16190, at *6 (N.D. Ga. May 28, 1996) (holding that “[t]he 
reasonableness of plaintiff’s belief that a violation of Title VII had occurred is to be judged 
based upon the legal authority existing at the time of the supposedly protected activity.”)  See 
also Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, White, Or Wrong: “Misperception Discrimination” 
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Circuit in 2015.  In Satterwhite v. City of Houston,
50
 a city employee 
complained to Human Resources about a supervisor using the phrase “Heil 
Hitler” during a work meeting at which his Jewish co-worker was present.51  
The supervisor was verbally reprimanded by a more senior manager.  A short 
time later, the offending supervisor became Satterwhite’s direct supervisor.  
Around the same time, the Anti-Defamation League sent letters to the Office 
of Inspector General (OIG) for the City that complained about the Hitler 
comment and prompted the OIG to investigate.  The OIG also found the 
supervisor at fault.  Over the next few months, the offending supervisor 
disciplined the plaintiff several times and eventually demoted him two 
grades.  At that point, Satterwhite filed a complaint with the EEOC, claiming 
retaliation under Title VII and Texas law. 
Mr. Satterwhite did not fare well at either the district or circuit court 
levels.  The district court rejected his claim because he failed to prove a 
causal link between his protected activity and his demotion.52  At the Fifth 
Circuit, however, the court, citing Breeden and prior Fifth Circuit precedent, 
focused not on the causal link but rather on whether the opposition conduct 
was protected under Title VII’s retaliation provision.  And like in Breeden, 
the court concluded that “While Satterwhite’s actions could qualify as 
opposing under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), for his actions to be protected 
activities, Satterwhite must also have had a reasonable belief that [the] 
comment created a hostile work environment under Title VII.”53  This, the 
court concluded, he could not demonstrate since isolated incidents generally 
do not amount to unlawful conduct under Title VII.  As a result, the plaintiff 
“could not have reasonably believed that this incident was actionable under 
Title VII, and therefore, it ‘cannot give rise to protected activity.’”54  The 
Fifth Circuit simply and with little explanation utilized Breeden’s formula: 
if the underlying conduct does not, according to a court, amount to unlawful 
discrimination under Title VII, then the plaintiff, a non-lawyer city 
employee, could not have reasonably believed that the conduct violated Title 
VII and, as a result, his complaint was not protected against retaliation.55 
 
And the State Of Title VII Protection, 47 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 87, 144) (arguing for a more 
objective approach for assessing the merits of a discrimination claim). 
 50.  602 F. App’x 585 (2015). 
 51.  Id. at 586-87. 
 52.  Id. at 586. 
 53.  Id. at 588. 
 54.  Id. at 589. 
 55.  In another surprising passage, the Fifth Circuit rejected Satterwhite’s argument that 
the conduct was an unlawful employment practice because the OIG determined that it 
“violated an executive order of the mayor of Houston prohibiting the use of racial, ethnic, and 
gender slurs.”  Satterwhite, 602 F. App’x  at 589.  The court responded that “the definition of 
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Although the Fifth Circuit in Satterwhite gave this doctrine slightly 
more consideration than Breeden, an even more extensive discussion of the 
issue appears in two cases out of the Fourth Circuit, from 2006 and 2015 
respectively.  In Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corporation,56 the court 
faced a set of facts similar to those in Breeden and Satterwhite.  An employee 
was present while a co-worker made offensive comments, complained about 
those comments, and was ultimately terminated.  In Jordan, the African 
American plaintiff and his white co-worker were in the break room watching 
television coverage of several highly publicized sniper shootings in the 
Washington, D.C. area when the white employee stated: “They should put 
those two black monkeys in a cage with a bunch of black apes and let the 
apes f-k them.”57  The plaintiff complained to supervisors and upper level 
managers.58  One month later, he was terminated for being “disruptive,” 
because his position had “come to an end,” and because, he was told, IBM 
employees and officials (with whom he worked) “don’t like you and you 
don’t like them.”59 
When the plaintiff claimed retaliation, his claim was rejected by both 
the district and circuit courts because one racist comment does not create an 
actionable hostile work environment and, as a result, the plaintiff did not 
engage in protected activity when he complained about it.60  At the Fifth 
Circuit, Jordan raised the argument that as a policy matter and in light of 
Supreme Court precedent in Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth61 and 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,62 this conclusion placed employees in an 
impossible “double bind.”63  On the one hand, prior precedent encourages 
early reporting of harassment in order to prevent hostile environments from 
arising64 and even requires such reporting in order to hold an employer liable 
 
‘unlawful employment practice’ in Title VII is defined by Congress not state or local laws, 
and . . . no reasonable person could find the ‘Heil Hitler’ incident alone satisfied Congress’s 
definition.” Id.  Even though the interpretation of hostile work environment upon which the 
court relies is drawn from court precedent and that nowhere in Title VII does the statute define 
hostile work environment or explain that a single incident cannot give rise to a claim of 
unlawful sexual harassment, the court refers to the statute as if it provides a clear and obvious 
definition of an unlawful employment practice such that all employees should understand its 
meaning. 
 56.  458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006).  
 57.  Id. at 336. 
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Id. at 337. 
 60.  Id. at 337-38. 
 61.  524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 62.  524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 63.  Jordan, 458 F.3d at 341-42. 
 64.  Id. 
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for unlawful harassment.
65
  But, as the plaintiff noted, “[f]ew workers would 
accept this early-reporting invitation [to report violations] if they knew they 
could be fired for their efforts.”66  Nonetheless, the court rejected this 
argument, maintaining first that the plain meaning of the statute provides 
protection when “the employee responds to an actual unlawful employment 
practice.”67  Second, the court noted that this language may be interpreted 
“generously” to provide protection when an employee “responds to an 
employment practice that the employee reasonably believes is unlawful.”68  
Then, like the courts in Breeden and Satterwhite, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that based on the allegation of a single incident, “no objectively 
reasonable person could have believed that the IBM office was, or was soon 
going to be, infected by severe or pervasive racist, threatening, or humiliating 
harassment.”69  In other words: 
Although Jordan could reasonably have concluded that only a 
racist would resort to such crudity even in times when emotions 
run high, the mere fact that one’s coworker has revealed himself 
to be racist is not enough to support an objectively reasonable 
conclusion that the workplace has likewise become racist.70 
Again, the court surmised that an average “reasonable” worker should 
know the difference between offensive, troubling, and even racist comments 
and behavior and an unlawful act. 
In light of this strange conclusion by the majority, the dissent raised 
concerns about some of the more troubling aspects of this holding.  First, the 
dissent pointed to the severity of the conduct in this case and its particularly 
humiliating and degrading nature to African Americans.71  Perhaps even 
more importantly, the dissent noted that in judging what is and is not an 
unlawful discriminatory act, particularly with regards to hostile work 
environment sexual harassment, the legal test “can be a bit of a moving 
target; there is no ‘mathematically precise test.’”72  This point cannot be 
understated—if courts might differ as to whether or not a hostile work 
environment has been created, how can an employee without legal training 
be expected to make the determination before complaining to management?  
 
 65.  Id. at 342 (Plaintiffs are in a “double bind—risking firing by reporting harassing 
conduct early, or waiting to report upon pain of having an otherwise valid claim dismissed.”). 
 66.  Id. at 338. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. (italics in original). 
 69.  Id. at 341. 
 70.  Id. at 341 (italics in original). 
 71.  Id. at 350-51. 
 72.  Id. at 351. 
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As the dissent ultimately concluded: “[I]t is not for unelected judges to 
decide that Congress’s chosen remedy is unimportant, and that it may be 
effectively eviscerated by some judicially created ‘reasonable belief’ 
requirement.”73 
Given the intensity of the disagreement between the majority and 
dissent in Jordan, it is perhaps not surprising that the Fourth Circuit chose to 
revisit this issue again in 2015.  In Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp.,74 
the dissenting judge in Jordan, now writing for the court en banc, reversed 
the original panel’s affirmation of summary judgment for the employer in a 
case with facts that are remarkably similar to those in Jordan.75  In Boyer-
Liberto, a cocktail waitress at a resort was called a “porch monkey” twice in 
a twenty-four hour period, threatened with job loss by her white manager and 
was fired soon after she reported the racial harassment to management.76  The 
initial panel had concluded that in this case, like in Jordan, no employee 
could have reasonably believed that a hostile work environment was 
present.77  The en banc panel reversed, differing specifically on the existence 
of a hostile work environment and concluding that despite it being an isolated 
incident, the severity of the comments and the supervisor’s threats of 
discharge made it an extremely serious incident that could rise to the level of 
a hostile work environment.78 
The Fourth Circuit’s change in this case is subtle.  The court was clearly 
uncomfortable with the initial ruling given the extreme nature of the 
comments at issue.  As a result, it essentially lowered the standard for finding 
the potential for a hostile work environment and indicated that even an 
isolated incident, if serious enough, could constitute an unlawful act giving 
rise to an objectively reasonable belief and retaliation protection.  The court 
also commented on the difficulty of limiting retaliation protection when there 
is bias in the workplace: “[A] lack of protection is no inconsequential matter, 
for ‘fear of retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent instead of 
voicing their concerns about bias and discrimination.’”79  Nonetheless, the 
actual difference between Jordan and Boyer-Liberto is quite slim.  Despite 
acknowledging the dangers of narrow retaliation protections, the court did 
not change the “objectively reasonable belief” standard in any meaningful 
 
 73.  Id. at 357. 
 74.  786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 75.  Id. at 268. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 275-76. 
 78.  Id. at 285 (Awarding relief on the retaliation claims by “finding that [defendant’s] 
conduct was severe enough to give [plaintiff] a reasonable belief that a hostile environment, 
although not fully formed, was in progress.”). 
 79.  Id. at 283. 
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way.  Instead of acknowledging that a lay person’s “reasonable belief” likely 
differs dramatically from a court’s view, the Fourth Circuit maintained its 
approach and merely adjusted its conclusion about when a court might find 
a hostile work environment.80 
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits are by no means alone in applying the 
“reasonable belief” doctrine in such a narrow way.  The Second Circuit, 
considering a case involving allegations that a co-worker petted the 
plaintiff’s cheeks with her hands and kissed her on the lips, in addition to an 
overall working environment “characterized by lewd, racial, and sexual 
comments and innuendos,” concluded that “‘[n]o reasonable person could 
have believed that [a] single incident’ of sexually inappropriate behavior by 
a co-worker could amount to sexual harassment” and thus deemed the 
plaintiff’s complaint to be unprotected.81  The Second Circuit likewise 
reached a similar conclusion in a case involving sex stereotyping rather than 
harassment.82  Considering the plaintiff’s claim that she, as a female 
secretary, received a certain type of assignment because of her sex, the court 
relied again on the reasonable belief doctrine to reject her retaliation claim.83  
Despite the fact that the jury found in her favor on the underlying 
discrimination claim, the court concluded that without male comparators and 
without additional evidence of gender discrimination, the plaintiff could not 
have had a reasonable belief that the conduct she complained of was 
unlawful.84  The Third Circuit, considering a case involving a single 
allegation of sexual harassment concluded that the plaintiff’s efforts to report 
sexual comments did not constitute protected activity.85  The Eleventh 
Circuit reached the same conclusion but in a case in which the plaintiff, a 
waitress at Waffle House, alleged that her manager made numerous 
 
 80.  Even still, the dissent in Boyer-Liberto voiced serious concerns about a “sub voce 
chipping away at the objectively reasonable belief standard.”  Id. at 290.  In particular the 
dissent worried about an increase in unfounded retaliation claims, the trammeling of free 
speech values if “all manner of perceived slights” becomes reportable, and the construction 
of workplace barriers between the races and sexes. Id. at 291.  The problem with the dissent’s 
concerns, as will be discussed in greater detail in Part III, is that the psychology research 
demonstrates that the opposite is true.  The suppression of anger that results from a lack of 
protection for employee complaints is what causes unhealthy workplaces not the reverse.  See 
infra Parts II and III. 
 81.  Chenette v. Kenneth Cole Prods., 345 F. App’x 615, 617-19 (2nd Cir. 2009). 
 82.  See Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Natl. Realty & Devpt. Corp., 136 F.3d 276 (2nd Cir. 1998) 
(denying reversal of judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff did not show any reasonable 
belief that employer actually relied on gender when assigning work). 
 83.  Id. at 292. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  See Theriault v. Dollar Gen., 336 F. App’x 172 (3rd 2009) (denying the plaintiff’s 
claim on the basis of the reasonable belief standard). 
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comments about the size of her breasts, called her “Dolly,” and pulled her 
hair, and that an assistant manager admitted that he had been accused of 
sexual harassment but that “nothing happened” as a result of the accusation.86  
The Eleventh Circuit noted specifically that for opposition conduct to be 
protected, “[a] plaintiff must demonstrate that she had a subjective, good-
faith belief that her employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices 
and that her belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record 
presented.  The plaintiff’s subjective belief is measured against the 
substantive law at the time of the offense.”87  The court seemed to admit that 
the law on discriminatory practices is in flux but nonetheless expected the 
plaintiff to be knowledgeable about the state of the law at the time of her 
complaint.  Finally, the Tenth Circuit, in a case involving racial comments 
directed at a white woman who was married to a black man, concluded that 
despite a jury verdict in her favor on the underlying discrimination claim, 
“No reasonable person could have believed that the single . . . incident 
violated Title VII’s standard.”88  These cases are a sampling of likeminded 
rulings in all the circuits where the doctrine continues to be upheld and 
applied in somewhat shocking ways.89 
B. The “Manner of the Complaint” Doctrine 
The second doctrine that this Article considers is the “manner of the 
complaint” doctrine90 and focuses both on the first prong of the prima facie 
case of retaliation and on the pretext consideration.  In a “manner of the 
complaint” case, the plaintiff typically complains in an angry or aggressive 
manner about some experience of bias in the workplace.  The employer 
responds by punishing the employee through termination, demotion, or some 
other means.  When the employee sues claiming retaliation, the employer 
responds that the “punishment” was in response to the way in which the 
employee complained and not to the complaint itself.  And courts, generally 
 
 86.  Henderson v. Waffle House, Inc., 238 F. App’x 499, 502 (11th Cir. 2007).  
Presumably, the name calling referred to Dolly Parton because of her famously large breasts. 
See Frances Romero, Dolly Parton’s Breasts, TIME (Sept. 1, 2010), http://content.time.com
/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2015171_2015172_2015159,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/VG6F-7CBD ] (describing Parton’s “two most famous assets”).  
 87.  Henderson, 238 F. App’x. at 501 (internal citations omitted). 
 88.  Robinson v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs. LLC, 365 F. App’x 104, 113 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 89.  See Senn, supra note 22, at charts 1 & 2 (compiling “unprotected complaint” cases 
in the circuit courts) (note that Lexis version of article contains no page numbers). 
 90.  We have chosen to name this approach to insubordination cases the “manner of the 
complaint” doctrine to highlight that employers and courts focus here on the form in which 
the complaint is made rather than its substance. 
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hesitant to question the business judgment of employers, typically side with 
the employer without a serious consideration of the details of the employee’s 
complaint, the context in which his or her outburst occurred, the culture of 
the workplace and the behavior that the employer generally tolerates, or any 
other factors.91  As with the “reasonable belief” doctrine, it is helpful to 
examine the details of some of the cases that apply this “manner of the 
complaint” doctrine, which spans multiple circuits and has been in use since 
at least the 1980’s. 
One of the clearest examples of this doctrine came out of the Seventh 
Circuit and involved an employee at a sugar company.92  As a result of the 
disappearance of some sugar, the company began random searches.  The 
plaintiff, an African American warehouse manager, was accused of stealing 
sugar and subjected to searches, and the Director of Operations called him a 
“black thief” despite the fact that the searches did not yield any evidence of 
theft.93  The plaintiff filed a complaint with both the EEOC and the Indiana 
Civil Rights Commission alleging race-based disparate treatment and 
another charge with the EEOC alleging retaliation based on overtime 
disbursals.94 
Approximately two months after receiving his right to sue letter from 
the EEOC, a series of events occurred that ultimately led to the plaintiff’s 
termination.95  First, the director of operations sent a memo asking the 
operations managers to list their five main performance goals.  The plaintiff, 
believing he was being singled out for this task, went to the director’s office 
to complain and, per the employer’s testimony, “became very loud and 
angry.”96  A few days later, despite the fact that the plaintiff complied with 
the task, the director gave him “a written warning stating that any future 
incidents of insolent or disrespectful behavior would not be tolerated and 
would result in disciplinary action, including possible termination.”97  The 
plaintiff responded with a written memorandum stating that “he did not 
intend to appear hostile.”98  Thereafter, the president of the company met 
with the plaintiff, intending to reprimand the plaintiff for his “insubordinate 
conduct” during his meeting with the director.99  The conversation escalated 
to an argument of sorts with the plaintiff allegedly interrupting the president 
 
 91.  See infra Part I.B. 
 92.  McClendon v. Ind. Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 93.  Id. at 792.  
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 793. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
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and shouting.
100
  The president testified that he told the plaintiff he “was not 
going to engage in a shouting match” and then terminated him for “grossly 
insubordinate conduct during the meeting.”101 
The Seventh Circuit quickly established that the plaintiff had met his 
prima facie case of retaliation and focused on the pretext question.  The court 
concluded that the employer’s legitimate reason—insubordination—could 
not be shown to be pretextual, dooming the plaintiff’s claim.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court clarified the lens with which it evaluates claims of 
insubordination: 
Although there is some disagreement about the details of that 
encounter, the record does not place in doubt ISI’s contention that 
it made a good-faith estimation that Mr. McClendon had been 
disrespectful.  It is important to recall that it is not relevant 
whether Mr. McClendon actually was insubordinate.  All that is 
relevant is whether his employer was justified in coming to that 
conclusion. . . . The record before us raises no genuine issue of 
triable fact as to whether Mr. McClendon’s superiors believed in 
good faith that he was insubordinate.102 
The essential question, as posed by the court, is whether the employer 
demonstrates that it acted in good faith when claiming that the employee was 
insubordinate, not whether that determination was accurate, objectively 
reasonable, or consistent with prior decisions.  The court is similarly 
unconcerned with the factors that precipitated the plaintiff’s insubordinate 
behavior or comments and is concerned only with the employer’s subjective 
determination that it was inappropriate. 
The Seventh Circuit’s approach, with its focus on the employer’s 
subjective finding of insubordination, was echoed by the Sixth Circuit in a 
2008 case involving a line-worker in a recycled paperboard plant.103  In Clack 
v. Rock-Tenn Company, the court considered a case in which the plaintiff 
walked off the floor of the plant to report perceived harassment rather than 
comply with his supervisor’s direction.104  The court rejected the plaintiff’s 
claim that he was not actually insubordinate but was merely following a prior 
instruction to immediately report harassment.  Like the Seventh Circuit, the 
court here concluded that: 
[S]o long as the employer honestly believed in the proffered reason 
given for its employment action and that honest belief is 
 
 100.  Id. at 794. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 799 (emphasis added). 
 103.  Clack v. Rock-Tenn Co., 304 F. App’x 399 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 104.  Id. 
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reasonably grounded on particularized facts that were before it at 
the time of the employment action, a plaintiff cannot establish 
pretext even if the employer’s reason is ultimately found to be 
mistaken, foolish, trivial or baseless. . . . “[A]rguing about the 
accuracy of the employer’s assessment is [merely] a distraction 
because the question is not whether the employer’s reasons for a 
decision are right but whether the employer’s description of its 
reasons is honest.105 
Again, the court focused on the subjective belief of the employer, 
refusing to discuss the context in which the employee acted insubordinately 
and any justification for his angry, hostile, or unruly behavior.  Here, too, the 
claim of insubordination receives little scrutiny — as long as it appears to be 
a sincere belief on the part of the employer, it is almost automatically 
accepted by the court as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the 
termination, precluding any further consideration of the retaliation claim. 
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits are by no means alone in this 
determination.  The Second Circuit, citing cases in the First, Eighth, Ninth, 
Tenth, and D.C. Circuits reached a similar conclusion and even more 
explicitly explained the irrelevance of the factors that precipitated the 
outburst including the fact that the plaintiff was responding to perceived 
bias.106  Matima v. Celli involved a pharmacist employee who made 
numerous complaints about perceived bias and unlawful actions taken 
against him by his superiors.107  Unsatisfied with the response from his 
employer, the plaintiff became increasingly more agitated in his discussions 
with management.108  Ultimately, the employer terminated the plaintiff for 
“gross insubordination,” claiming that the plaintiff had become unbearably 
disruptive and had caused “such havoc and discontent in the lab that it was 
not a suitable work environment for the remaining people on the staff.”109 
While the facts in Matima, as relayed by the court, certainly suggest 
that the employer was out of options and could no longer work with this 
particular employee, the court’s rhetoric is not limited to such an extreme 
situation and could be applied to curtail far less egregious behavior.  Noting 
the existence of complaints of bias in this case, the court explained: 
We have held generally that insubordination and conduct that 
 
 105.  Id. at 406 (quoting Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 1998) (italics 
in original)(internal quotations omitted)). 
 106.  Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming a jury finding that defendant’s 
employment actions were motivated by unlawful retaliation). 
 107.  Id. at 72-75. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 76. 
EISENSTADT & GEDDES_FINAL_EIC ADJUSTMENTS - COPY (DO NOT DELETE) 9/27/2018  3:20 PM 
2017] SUPPRESS’D ANGER, RETAL’N DOCT., & WORKPLACE CULTURE 169 
 
 
disrupts the workplace are legitimate reasons for firing an 
employee.  . . . We see no reason why the general principle would 
not apply, even when a complaint of discrimination is 
involved. . . . Many of our sister circuits have come to a similar 
conclusion, holding that disruptive or unreasonable protests 
against discrimination are not protected activity under Title VII 
and therefore cannot support a retaliation claim.110 
Again, here, the court notes that the context of the complaint is 
irrelevant if the employer concludes that the manner in which the complaint 
was made was somehow unacceptable or disruptive.  It is easy to imagine a 
scenario in which an employee who feels he is the victim of extreme 
workplace bias might react less than professionally while complaining about 
the discriminatory conduct.  Nonetheless, the Second Circuit made clear that 
the reason for the outburst is irrelevant so long as the employer honestly 
believes it to be unacceptable. 
Finally, at least one court has applied this logic to cases in which the 
plaintiff’s outburst is physical in nature and is a response to sexually 
aggressive behavior by a supervisor.  In Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., the 
plaintiff claimed that her supervisor commented on her erect nipples, which 
lead to an altercation between the two, and finally, her supervisor “stepped 
extremely close to Cruz and called her a ‘f____ing cunt.’”111  The plaintiff 
responded by slapping her supervisor, who then placed her in a headlock.  
The incident only ended when upper management intervened.112  The 
employer eventually terminated both the plaintiff and her supervisor 
“pursuant to Coach’s rule against ‘physical or verbal assault while on 
 
 110.  Id. at 79 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Robbins v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist., 
186 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir. 1999).  See also Kempcke v. Monsanto Co., 132 F.3d 442, 
445 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the court “must also consider whether [oppositional] conduct 
was so disruptive, excessive, or ‘generally inimical to [the] employer’s interests . . . as to be 
beyond the protection’ of [the retaliation provision of the ADEA]”); O’Day v. McDonnell 
Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding “[a]n employee’s 
opposition activity is protected only if it is ‘reasonable in view of the employer’s interest in 
maintaining a harmonious and efficient operation.’”); Pendleton v. Rumsfeld, 202 U.S. App. 
D.C. 102, 628 F.2d 102, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding “[a] question of retaliation is not raised 
by a removal for conduct inconsistent with [the employee’s] duties, unless its use as a mere 
pretext is clear.”); Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 
230 (1st Cir. 1976) (addressing “whether plaintiff’s overall conduct was so generally inimical 
to her employer’s interests, and so ‘excessive,’ as to be beyond the protection of section 704(a) 
even though her actions were generally associated with her complaints of illegal employer 
conduct.”).  
 111.  Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 2000) (vacating and 
remanding a hostile work environment claim because the employee established at trial a 
genuine factual dispute regarding that claim). 
 112.  Id. 
EISENSTADT & GEDDES_FINAL_EIC ADJUSTMENTS - COPY (DO NOT DELETE) 9/27/2018  3:20 PM 
170 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20.1 
 
 
company premises.’”
113
  In response to the plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the 
court noted that “[s]lapping one’s harasser, even assuming arguendo that 
Cruz did so in response to Title VII-barred harassment, is not a protected 
activity.”114  The court opined that the plaintiff had other options including 
leaving the room and reporting the incident to Human Resources.  Finally, 
in its most telling statement, the court noted that although the plaintiff 
claimed that she believed her physical response to be in self-defense, the act 
still does not receive protection under Title VII’s retaliation provision.115  
Again, the court deemed plaintiff’s viewpoint to be irrelevant to the analysis.  
The fact that the plaintiff in this case may very well have felt threatened by 
her supervisor’s verbal and physical aggression did not aid her claim that her 
opposition conduct should be protected.116  Again, the court generally 
disregarded the context of the outburst, the reason for the plaintiff’s anger, 
and the victim’s viewpoint overall, giving the employer something akin to 
carte blanche so long as it sincerely believed the employee’s conduct to be 
unacceptable.117 
 
 113.  Id. at 564-65. 
 114.  Id. at 566. 
 115.  Id. at 567.  The court did, however, specifically state: “We need not decide here 
whether violence in opposition to Title VII-prohibited behavior might, in some circumstances, 
be protected under Title VII’s retaliation provision.” Id. 
 116.  There is at least one recent case that takes an opposing view on the issue of physical 
resistance to sexual harassment.  In Speed v. WES Healthcare Sys., the plaintiff alleged that 
she was verbally sexually harassed for thirteen months by her co-worker and that she made 
complaints to management at least twice during this time.  93 F. Supp. 3d 351, 354 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 26, 2015).  The long period of verbal harassment culminated in a physical touching in 
which the harasser groped her leg.  Id.  After the first touching, the plaintiff warned her co-
worker that if he touched her again, she would defend herself.  When he then reached out to 
touch her, she struck him on the side of his face, and he stopped his efforts.  Id.  After an 
investigation, the employer determined that the co-worker had sexually harassed the plaintiff 
but terminated both employees, one for sexual harassment and the other for physically 
assaulting a co-worker.  Id. at 354, 359.  The court in Speed found for the plaintiff despite the 
employer’s argument that the physical assault was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 
the termination.  Id. at 364-65.  In so doing, the court distinguished its holding from Cruz, 
where the slap itself was the only purported opposition conduct whereas in Speed, the plaintiff 
had complained to management multiple times.  Id. at 360.  The court then specifically 
considered the viewpoint of the victim and concluded, “If physically striking her alleged 
harasser resulted from the mindset of a person suffering ongoing harassment and fearing for 
her bodily security, the proposition that Title VII would not afford Speed protection under 
those circumstances seems inconsistent with the purposes of the statute.”  Id. at 361.   
 117.  In addition to the types of cases we discuss where the court views an angry complaint 
as insubordination rather than protected opposition conduct, there are also cases in which the 
“insubordination” is one factor among many that motivated the termination.  Carle, supra note 
18, at 204-07.  In mixed motive cases, the employer’s liability is drastically reduced if it can 
demonstrate that it would have taken the adverse action absent the retaliatory motive.  Carle 
supra note 18 at 204.  But, as Susan Carle points out, “[l]ogically, if the decision-maker finds 
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As is evident from the numerous cases described previously, despite a 
seeming trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence to broaden retaliation 
protection,118 the “objectively reasonable belief” doctrine and the “manner of 
the complaint” doctrine are highly effective in dramatically narrowing the 
conduct that ultimately receives retaliation protection.  The next Section will 
discuss existing scholarly critiques of these doctrines and proposals to undo 
some of the damage they have created. 
C. Scholarship on these Problematic Doctrines 
This Article is by no means the first to raise concerns about these two 
retaliation doctrines.  A number of scholars have, over the last ten years, 
taken issue with the narrow way in which courts have seen fit to protect 
opposition conduct under these doctrines.  These scholars have typically 
focused on one doctrine or the other, and each scholar offers a different 
approach to correct the problems created by these doctrines.  Nonetheless, 
their overall critiques focus on retaliation protection as serving the ultimate 
goals of Title VII and the way in which these doctrines undermine those 
goals.  This Section will briefly discuss some of the existing scholarship in 
this area in order to highlight the new lens that this article brings to the 
discussion. 
Deborah Brake’s 2005 article on retaliation protections was one of the 
first recent works to focus exclusively and extensively on the subject of 
retaliation.119  Brake posits that retaliation is a form of discrimination and 
that protecting against it is integral to Title VII.120  With regard to the 
“reasonable belief” doctrine, Brake makes clear that “as applied by courts, 
the . . . doctrine severely undercuts the law’s protection of persons who 
challenge inequality.”121  Beyond this general critique, Brake discusses 
several specific problems with courts’ use of the doctrine in harassment cases 
in particular.  For example, she notes that its application “masks the 
complexity of discrimination and squeezes out broader, competing 
understandings.”122  The notion that a worker’s “reasonable belief” about the 
 
that discrimination or retaliation was a motivating factor, it cannot then be said that the 
employer had an independent legitimate reason for its action when it fires an employee for 
insubordination related to or caused by that discrimination or retaliation.”  Carle supra note 
18, at 205.  Nonetheless, courts often disregard this “logical point,” essentially taking the teeth 
out of retaliation protection.  Carle supra note 18 at 205.  
 118.  See generally Berkowitz and Eisenstadt, supra note 24. 
 119.  Brake, supra note 8.  
 120.  Brake, supra note 8, at 20-22. 
 121.  Brake, supra note 8, at 23. 
 122.  Brake, supra note 8, at 86. 
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unlawful nature of the underlying biased conduct is determined by the 
court’s interpretation of statutory protections ignores the fact that courts, 
relying on “common sense,” often reach vastly different conclusions when 
interpreting Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination statutes.123  
Expecting an ordinary worker to understand the nuances in the law and 
interpret workplace behavior as the court would is problematic to begin with 
but is compounded by the fact that even courts disagree among themselves 
about what is covered.124  In addition, Brake notes that average workers’ 
main sources of information about bias (and sexual harassment in particular) 
are (1) cultural norms and (2) employee handbooks, both of which suggest 
that a broad array of behaviors is unacceptable in the workplace despite the 
fact that many of these behaviors would not rise to the level of unlawful 
harassment.125  This makes it inordinately difficult for an employee to meet 
the “reasonable belief” requirement in questionable situations.  Moreover, 
the “severity and pervasiveness” standard that courts apply to determine 
whether harassment is unlawful means that an employee who complains too 
early in the harassment period (i.e. after only one or two instances of 
harassment) may be terminated without protection because the underlying 
conduct has not yet become “pervasive.”126  Finally, Brake notes: 
The double bind created by this standard is obvious: if the 
employee waits too long to complain, she risks losing a potential 
harassment claim for not having done enough to demonstrate that 
the harassment was unwelcome, as well as for failing to meet an 
affirmative defense if her failure to complain sooner was 
“unreasonable.”  In addition, certain harassment claims require 
persons to complain internally as a prerequisite for institutional 
liability, thus putting them in a risky position unless accorded full 
protection from retaliation.127 
Overall, Brake takes issue with the overly restrictive nature of the 
“reasonable belief” doctrine, the way in which it inhibits employees with 
serious complaints from coming forward, and the confusion it can create 
among employees who are trying to protest biased workplaces. 
Two years after Brake’s article, two more scholars tackled the 
 
 123.  Brake, supra note 8, at 86-87. 
 124.  Brake, supra note 8, at 89.  As Brake notes, “the problem is not simply that most 
people lack the legal expertise to ascertain where that line begins and ends, but that the 
uncertainties of litigation prevent such a determination from being made in advance.”   
 125.  Brake, supra note 8, at 86-87. 
 126.  Brake, supra note 8, at 87-88. 
 127.  Brake, supra note 8, at 88 (citing Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., 123 F.3d 868, 873 
(6th Cir. 1997) (requiring notice to establish employer liability for co-worker sexual 
harassment)). 
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“reasonable belief” doctrine exclusively, and suggested reforms to better 
promote the purposes of Title VII.  Lawrence Rosenthal, like Brake, 
contends that the doctrine is overly restrictive and creates numerous 
problems for victims of workplace discrimination.128  He suggests that 
instead of requiring a plaintiff to prove both a subjective, good faith belief 
that the underlying conduct she opposes is unlawful and that the belief was 
objectively reasonable, that good faith on its own should be enough.129  In 
support of this proposition, Rosenthal notes that his approach would further 
Title VII’s goals by encouraging employees to come forward with 
complaints.130  In addition, the good faith approach would be in keeping with 
the notion that Title VII, as a remedial statute, should be interpreted 
broadly.131  The subjective standard would eliminate the double bind 
discussed by Brake and would create greater consistency among courts since 
the issue would be the sincerity of the plaintiff’s belief (a factual matter) 
rather than the objectively reasonable nature of the determination (a legal 
conclusion).132  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Rosenthal points out 
the common sense nature of using a good faith standard: 
Although requiring an objective component makes sense in the 
context of a hostile environment claim, in which an employee is 
seeking damages for an employer’s or a co-worker’s behavior, 
requiring an objective component in an anti-retaliation case makes 
no such sense, as the inappropriate conduct is not the basis of the 
employer’s potential liability, but rather it is the employer’s 
response to the employee’s complaint about that conduct that 
forms the basis of any potential liability.133 
Similarly, Brianne Gorod, argues for a rejection of the “reasonableness” 
requirement and a replacement with an assessment of whether the plaintiff 
was acting in good faith at the time of the complaint.134  Gorod focuses on 
the benefits of a good faith approach and particularly the benefits of 
encouraging early reporting of harassment.135  Early reports have the capacity 
to (1) prevent further harassment, (2) allow employees and employers to 
conciliate claims and avoid the costs of litigation, (3) enable victims of 
harassment to “ameliorate the psychological and dignitary harms that 
 
 128.  Rosenthal, supra note 17. 
 129.  Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 1130-31. 
 130.  Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 1131. 
 131.  Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 1131. 
 132.  Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 1131.  
 133.  Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 1131.  
 134.  Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s Anti-
Retaliation Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1469 (2007). 
 135.  Id. at 1503-04. 
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harassment causes,” and (4) most importantly, makes it easier to change 
stereotypes that continue to permeate the workplace.136 
Perhaps noting the agreement in the scholarly community with regard 
to the critique of the doctrine but frustrated by the lack of any doctrinal 
change, in the last several years, two additional scholars have written on this 
topic with particularly innovative proposals.  Matthew Green questions the 
practicality of proposing a subjective standard given that courts generally 
prefer objective standards in interpreting Title VII.137  Green’s proposal is to 
use the objective standard but to expand the meaning of “reasonableness” 
using a totality of the circumstances approach.138  For example, Green 
suggests that to determine what constitutes “reasonable belief,” courts 
should consider all of the factors that may influence the employee’s belief 
including his identity (race, sex etc.) and the employer’s representations 
about what constitutes discrimination and what to report to management.139  
Craig Senn’s piece on the “reasonable belief” doctrine is similarly 
innovative.140  Recognizing the difficulty in eliminating the “reasonableness” 
component of the standard, Senn proposes that courts interpret opposition 
conduct to include a “reasonable action” option.141  Senn suggests moving 
the inquiry away from whether the belief was reasonable in light of case law 
precedent and focusing instead on whether the action the employee took was 
reasonable in light of his honest belief.  For example, instead of questioning 
whether the employee’s belief that she was the victim of unlawful 
discrimination was reasonable, the court should look at whether her 
complaint to human resources was a reasonable action to take in light of her 
honest belief.142  Again, both of these scholars present novel approaches with 
the goals of protecting deserving employees and promoting the purpose and 
goals of anti-discrimination laws. 
The same focus is evident in the scholarship on the insubordination 
defense.  Terry Smith begins to tackle the problem with insubordination 
cases in her article on “everyday indignities” and race discrimination.143  She 
considers cases in which courts focus on the disruptive nature of the 
employee’s complaint or response to perceived discrimination to the 
exclusion of all else, including the underlying discrimination itself.  In 
particular, Smith discusses those actions and comments that appear minor to 
 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Green, supra note 22, at 763. 
 138.  Green, supra note 22, at 763. 
 139.  Green, supra note 22, at 764.  
 140.  Senn, supra note 22. 
 141.  Senn, supra note 22, at 2036. 
 142.  Senn, supra note 22, at 2043-44 
 143.  Smith, supra note 22, at 533. 
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a court but have far greater significance to a member of a racial minority and 
that, as a result, historical context, workplace context, and “cultural 
meaning” are essential to understanding an employee’s response to 
perceived bias.144  Smith argues that “[t]he employee who chooses to exercise 
self-help in opposing workplace racism rather than remaining silent or 
availing herself of the cumbersome and expensive recourse of formal charge 
and suit is entitled to greater protection than the courts have heretofore 
afforded.”145 
Similarly, Susan Carle’s recent article on insubordination cases 
considers several types of cases where this doctrine is used:  (1) those in 
which courts view the insubordination (even if mild) as the legitimate reason 
for termination precluding recovery for the plaintiff, (2) those in which a 
mixed motive analysis applies with the insubordination as one motive for 
termination, and (3) those in which the court considers the reasonableness of 
a plaintiff’s opposition conduct, finding it unprotected if it is unreasonable.146  
Carle argues that there are numerous problems with courts’ approaches in 
these cases — namely, that they demonstrate faulty logic, that they 
undermine the objectives of Title VII, and that they create disincentives for 
employees and employers to resolve disputes before litigation.147  In 
response, Carle proposes several avenues to reform the problematic approach 
used in these cases, looking primarily to NLRB precedents for guidance.  As 
she notes, federal courts and the NLRB have different tolerance levels for 
angry employees. 
Even if employees go a bit over the line in their efforts at self-
advocacy, the NLRB reasons that it is better to err in the direction 
of protecting self-advocacy because doing so ensures more secure 
protection of employees’ exercise of statutorily protected rights.  
Under Title VII courts’ very different way of looking at employee 
conduct, on the other hand, employee self-expression at the 
moment of a dispute risks termination without later legal 
protection. . . . [T]he current Title VII regime insists on a kind of 
“sanitized workplace” where employees must behave with 
decorum, remaining docile to the point of virtual passivity or risk 
termination.148 
Looking to NLRB precedents, Carle argues, will benefit employees and 
 
 144.  Smith, supra note 22, at 536-37. 
 145.  Smith, supra note 22, at 533. 
 146.  Carle, supra note 18, at 189. 
 147.  Carle, supra note 18, at 186. 
 148.  Carle, supra note 18, at 187-88. 
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the underlying goals of Title VII.
149
 
Although each of these scholars takes a slightly different approach to 
the problem of overly narrow retaliation protection under the two doctrines 
discussed, the focus of their critiques is essentially the same — these 
doctrines undermine Title VII’s goal of eradication of workplace 
discrimination by making it easier to punish employees who come forward 
to complain.  In so doing, these scholars also highlight the overwhelming 
unfairness of the doctrines and the disservice they do to workers’ rights.  
While we agree with these analyses, our approach is somewhat different.  
The next Part will consider the impact of these doctrines on worker and 
workplace health and will critique the doctrines from the viewpoint of 
employers rather than only the workers. 
II. RETALIATION DOCTRINES INCENTIVIZE UNHEALTHY WORKPLACE 
BEHAVIOR 
As is likely evident from a consideration of the jurisprudence and 
scholarship on retaliation, the federal courts’ narrow approach to protecting 
opposition conduct and hasty dismissals of cases where the employee 
engaged in any disruptive behavior certainly undermine the primary goal of 
Title VII — eradication of discrimination in the workplace.150  If employees 
feel unsafe coming forward to report perceived bias, a large portion of 
unlawful discriminatory conduct will go unreported and thus unanswered.  
But the hesitation to report created by retaliation doctrines impacts more than 
the continued existence of discrimination.  Consideration of employees’ 
emotions and their impact on the workplace suggests that these doctrines 
likely also impact employees’ overall health and the health of the 
environment in which they spend the large majority of their time.  This 
Section will detail behavioral psychology research on anger in the 
workplace, its benefits, problems, and consequences and will consider the 
ways in which the previously-described retaliation doctrines serve to 
incentivize unhealthy behavior. 
 
 149.  See also Charles Sullivan, Taking Civility Too Far? WORKPLACE PROF BLOG (Aug. 
9, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2013/08/taking-civility-too-far.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/2FW2-6DBA ] (discussing problem of courts concluding that an em
ployer can legitimately fire an employee for “misconduct” during an EEOC mediation). 
 150.  Brake, supra note 8, at 70-72. 
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A. The Dual Threshold Model of Workplace Anger 
There are a number of significant studies of anger in the workplace.151  
This Article focuses on the dual threshold model of workplace anger because 
it considers the impact of three forms of anger in the organization: 
suppressed, expressed, and deviant.152  The model incorporates two 
“thresholds” (expression and impropriety) that reflect organizational 
emotion display norms and separate the three anger categories.153  The dual 
threshold model identifies anger’s potential for both favorable and 
unfavorable outcomes at work depending on the particular category of anger 
present and the organization’s tolerance for anger expression.  The model’s 
authors argue that negative consequences are most likely with suppressed 
and deviant anger.154 
Suppressed workplace anger can take two forms.  One is felt anger kept 
silent inside oneself.  Suppressed anger can also take the form of anger that 
is deliberately hidden from those able to address the anger-provoking 
incident, for example, management.  As a result, this form of anger is 
 
 151.  See generally JEFFREY W. KASSING, DISSENT IN ORGANIZATIONS (2011) 
(summarizing current research in field of anger in organizations and proposing future 
research); Donald E. Gibson & Ronda Roberts Callister, Anger in Organizations: Review and 
Integration, 36 J. OF MGMT. 66 (2010); Theresa A. Domagalski & Lisa A. Steelman, The 
Impact of Work Events and Disposition on the Experience and Expression of Employee Anger, 
13 ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 31 (2005) (discussing the causes and expression of employee 
anger); Julie Fitness, Anger in the workplace: an emotion script approach to anger episodes 
between workers and their superiors, co-workers, and subordinates, 21 J. OF ORGANIZA
TIONAL BEHAV. 147 (2000) (investigating laypeople’s accounts of causes and effects of anger 
in the workplace); Leigh L. Thompson, Janice Nadler, & Peter H. Kim, Some Like It Hot: The 
Case for the Emotional Negotiator, in SHARED COGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE MGMT. OF 
KNOWLEDGE (Leigh L. Thompson, et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that an emotional negotiator is 
an effectiveness negotiator); Theresa M. Glomb & Charles L. Hulin, Anger and Gender 
Effects in Observed Supervisor-Subordinate Dyadic Interactions, 72 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 281 (1997) (investigating the effects of supervisor’s 
anger on evaluations of the supervisor and subordinate); Thomas M. Begley, Expressed and 
Suppressed Anger as Predictors of Health Complaints, 15 J. OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 503 
(1994) (examining the relationship between anger and health complaints).  
 152.  See generally Deanna Geddes & Ronda R. Callister, Crossing the Line(s): A Dual 
Threshold Model of Expressing Anger in Organizations, 32 ACAD. OF MGMT. REVIEW 721 
(2007) (presenting a theoretical model of contextualized anger expression). 
 153.  See John Van Maanen & Gideon Kunda, ‘Real feelings’: Emotional expression and 
organizational culture, 11 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 43 (1989) (discussing the 
disparity between emotions organizational members feel and those they express); Anat 
Rafaeli & Robert I. Sutton, The expression of emotion in organizational life, in RES. IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1 (L. L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw eds., 1989) (discussing the 
consequences of the emotions expressed by members of an organization). 
 154.  Geddes and Callister, supra note 152. 
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displayed only to people unrelated to the incident — including sympathetic 
office mates.  It fails to cross the organization’s expression threshold because 
those who need to hear it to address the problem, do not, making it 
organizationally silent.155 
In contrast, when organizational members (i.e., employees) do display 
their anger, but in a manner deemed inappropriate by the organization, it also 
crosses an impropriety threshold. This becomes “deviant” anger – meaning 
it deviates from formal or informal norms of what constitutes “appropriate” 
emotion expression.156  The determination of what constitutes appropriate 
expression can vary by industry, geographic region, and individual 
organization.157  Anger becomes deviant either because it is viewed as an 
improper emotional response to something that occurred in the workplace or 
because the manner in which the emotion was expressed exceeded the norm 
in that particular workplace.158 
Expressed anger is best understood in relation to suppressed and deviant 
anger.  Expressed anger is simply the anger form found between the two 
thresholds.  It is anger conveyed to relevant parties in a manner deemed 
acceptable by organizational members.159  Expressed anger is an “emotion-
based form of employee voice.”160  It can be a form of challenging but 
proactive expression of dissatisfaction in “an attempt to change, rather than 
to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs.”161  Thus, expressed anger 
can be a form of “prosocial dissent” reflecting an employee’s social 
conscience in the workplace.162 
The dual threshold model challenges traditional views that workplace 
anger displays are, at best, unprofessional, and at worst, hostile actions.163  
 
 155.  See Craig C. Pinder & Karen Harlos, Employee Silence: Quiescence and 
Acquiescence as Response to Perceived Injustice, 20 RES. IN PERSONNEL AND HUMAN 
RESOURCES MGMT. 331 (2001) (revealing additional meanings related to employee silence); 
Elizabeth W. Morrison & Frances J. Milliken, Organizational Silence: A Barrier to Change 
and Development in a Pluralistic World, 25 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 706 (2000) (arguing that 
organizational forces cause employees to withhold information on potential problems and 
issues).  
 156.  See Danielle E. Warren, Constructive and Destructive Deviance in Organizations, 
28 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 622 (2003) (discussing how employee deviance from organizational 
norms can result in desirable and undesirable behavior); Geddes and Callister, supra note 152. 
 157.  Geddes and Callister supra note 152. 
 158.  Geddes and Callister, supra note 152. 
 159.  Geddes and Callister, supra note 152. 
 160.  Geddes and Callister, supra note 152, at 729. 
 161.  ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINES IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30 (1970). 
 162.  Kassing, supra note 151.  
 163.  See Deanna Geddes & Lisa T. Stickney, The trouble with sanctions: Organizational 
responses to deviant anger displays at work, 64 HUMAN REL. 201 (2011) (exploring reactions 
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Intensely expressed anger, for instance, is commonly portrayed as 
intentionally harmful, aggressive behavior, and thus, fundamentally 
antisocial and destructive.164  The dual threshold model argues instead that 
anger, rather than inherently aggressive or abnormal, is a natural response to 
intolerable situations such as workplace injustice and impropriety.165  
Displayed anger can provide valuable information to management,166 signal 
problems or violations at work that could negatively impact fellow 
employees and the organization,167 and help initiate necessary responses by 
management that address existing problems and facilitate improved 
organizational functioning and learning.168  Interpersonally, anger displays 
provide opportunities for offending parties to apologize, redress the wrong, 
and/or explain more clearly their position or intention.169  Given anger’s 
potential to help change intolerable and unfair situations at work and 
promote better understanding among organizational members, it should be 
not only acceptable, but appreciated or even honored.170  In contrast, when 
 
to employee anger expressions that deviate from emotional display norms). 
 164.  Id. at 204-05. 
 165.  See Daniel J. Canary, Brian H. Spitzberg, & Beth A. Semic, The Experience and 
Expression of Anger in Interpersonal Settings, in HANDBOOK OF COMM. AND EMOTION: RES., 
THEORY, APPLICATION AND CONTEXTS 189 (Peter A. Andersen & Laura K. Guerrero eds., 
1998) (discussing how people experience and express anger in interpersonal relationships); 
James R. Averill, Illusions of Anger, in AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE: SOCIAL INTERACTIONIST 
PERSP. 171 (R. B. Felson & J. T. Tedeschi eds., 1993). 
 166.  See Stéphane Côté, A Social Interaction Model of the Effects of Emotion Regulation 
on Work Strain, 30 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 509 (2005) (discussing how regulation of emotion 
in workplace impacts work strain); Gerald L. Clore, Karen Gasper, Erika Garvin, Affect as 
Information, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECT AND SOCIAL COGNITION 121 (J.P. Forgas ed. 2001); 
Deanna Geddes, Ronda Roberts Callister, Donald E. Gibson, A Message in the Madness: 
Functions of Workplace Anger in Organizational Life, ACAD. OF MGMT. PER. (IN PRESS) 
(examining common misunderstandings and unique challenges for managers, employees, and 
women expressing anger at work); Mario Mikulincer, Adult Attachment Style and Individual 
Differences in Functional Versus Dysfunctional Experiences of Anger, 74 J. OF PERSONALITY 
AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 513 (1998) (examining relationship between adult attachment and 
anger). 
 167.  See Michael W. Kramer & Jon A. Hess, Communication Rules for the Display of 
Emotions in Organizational Settings, 16 MGMT. COMM. Q. 66 (2002) (examining general 
communication rules that dictate emotion management in organization); Sandra L. Robinson 
& Rebecca J. Bennett, A Typology of Deviant Workplace Behaviors: A Multidimensional 
Scaling Study, 38 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 555 (1995) (suggesting that deviant workplace 
behaviors vary based on two dimensions). 
 168.  See Quy Nguyen Huy, Emotional Capability, Emotional Intelligence, and Radical 
Change, 24 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 325 (1999) (presenting multilevel theory of emotion and 
change). 
 169.  Geddes & Callister, supra note 152. 
 170.  See Debra E. Meyerson, If Emotions Were Honoured: A Cultural Analysis, in 
EMOTION IN ORGANIZATIONS 167 (S. Fineman ed. 2000) (arguing that social world and social 
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employees feel unable to express anger and dissent, they can retain silent 
rage and possibly engage in retaliatory behavior in an effort to “seek justice” 
for wrongs committed against them.171 
Believing in expressed anger’s potential to promote favorable outcomes 
at work is easiest if one finds the displayed anger to be a reasonable response 
to unjust or inappropriate actions by another.  Particularly relevant to this 
concept is the “placement” of the two thresholds.  The threshold placement 
is symbolic of an organization’s idiosyncratic notions of “acceptable” 
emotional expression at work.  As such, deviant anger, in particular, is a 
relative concept.172  Assessment of anger display propriety reflects salient 
codes of conduct in relation to the manner of expression.  For instance, in 
some workplaces, cursing under one’s breath could be considered 
unacceptable, while other work environments allow heated emotional 
exchanges.  Given that threshold placement is dynamic and dependent on 
varied cultural norms, organizational tolerance for anger displays can range 
from limited to broad.173  Organizations also may restrict displayed employee 
anger to such a degree that essentially no space exists between the expression 
and impropriety thresholds.174  In these environments, any displayed anger 
by employees is seen as inappropriate, and hence, punishable.175  When this 
occurs, organizations promote suppressed anger among employees.176 
Even with restrictive anger display norms in the organization, 
situational circumstances may help expand the space between the expression 
and impropriety thresholds.  This enhanced opportunity to display anger 
reduces the tendency to judge expressed anger as “crossing the line” into 
deviant anger.  Consequently, if an employee finds a situation highly 
provocative, unethical, or discriminatory and responds angrily, those 
observing this emotional display may find it completely appropriate, “given 
the circumstances.”177  When organizational members show “forbearance,” 
or increased leniency given circumstances leading to one’s anger, they help 
eliminate the moniker of deviant anger, and correspondingly, prevent 
 
science would be profoundly different if emotions were honored).  
 171.  See Leslie Perlow & Stephanie Williams, Is Silence Killing Your Company?, 81 
HARV. BUS. REV. 52 (2003) (discussing the detrimental cost of silence to firms and 
individuals); Robert J. Bies & Thomas M. Tripp, A Passion for Justice: The Rationality and 
Morality of Revenge, in JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE 197, 204 (R. Cropanzano ed. 2000) 
(discussing the social perceptions and consequences of revenge). 
 172.  See generally Warren, supra note 156. 
 173.  See generally Geddes & Callister, supra note 152. 
 174.  Geddes & Callister, supra note 152.  
 175.  Geddes & Callister, supra note 152. 
 176.  Geddes & Callister, supra note 152. 
 177.  Geddes & Callister, supra note 152. 
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sanctions against the angry employee.
178
  Overall, the more space between 
the expression and impropriety thresholds, or “zone of expressive 
tolerance,”179 the more organizational members will find employee anger 
expression acceptable and punitive actions unnecessary.  In contrast, less 
space between thresholds symbolizes a more constraining and sanctioning 
culture, one with limited opportunities for “expressed” anger and increased 
instances of “deviant” and “suppressed” anger.180 
Research testing the dual threshold model generally supports its key 
propositions regarding potential benefits of workplace anger expression.  For 
instance, in a study of deviant anger displays, results indicate that supportive 
responses by management and coworkers promoted favorable situational 
change at work, while sanctioning or doing nothing following these intense 
outbursts did not.181  Management responding to angry employees in a more 
supportive, rather than sanctioning manner, was seen as a way to “expand 
the space” between thresholds and promote more positive outcomes from 
expressed anger.182  Most interesting was the fact that researchers found no 
correlation between firing the angry individual and the belief among co-
workers that the situation improved at work.183  In many instances, deviant, 
unexpected and intense angry outbursts reflect “state” versus “trait” anger,184 
demonstrating a serious issue within the work environment, rather than 
within the supposed “troublemaker.”  For example, an intense outburst often 
reveals previously unexposed but widely felt unfairness, bias, or harassment 
of some kind as opposed to a personality trait in the employee who finally 
broke and exposed her anger. 
In addition, there is increasing research on the positive implications of 
an employee’s expression of anger.  Recent research reports that higher 
levels of organizational commitment and positive affectivity prompt 
employees to express anger, while lower levels of organizational 
commitment and negative affectivity increase the tendency to suppress anger 
 
 178.  George Nelson & John Dyck, Forbearance in leadership: Opportunities and risks 
involved in cutting followers some slack, 16 LEADERSHIP Q. 53 (2005). 
 179.  Stephen Fineman, EMOTION IN ORGANIZATIONS (1993); Stephen Fineman, 
Emotional arenas revisited, in EMOTION IN ORGANIZATIONS 1 (Stephen Fineman ed. 2000) 
(discussing science of emotional interactions between colleagues in close workplace settings).  
 180.  See generally Geddes & Callister, supra note 152. 
 181.  See generally Geddes & Stickney, supra note 163. 
 182.  Geddes & Stickney, supra note 163, at 221. 
 183.  Geddes & Stickney, supra note 163, at 221.  Those surveyed were witnesses to the 
anger episode. 
 184.  See Charles D. Spielberger, Susan S. Krasner, & Eldra P. Solomon, The experience, 
expression, and control of anger, in INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES, STRESS, AND HEALTH 
PSYCHOL. 89 (Michel Pierre Janisse ed. 1988) (discussing the wide range of reactions 
presented among people to the same stimuli, including those thought to provoke anger). 
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at work.
185
  These findings challenge those who characterize employee anger 
expression as deviant, inappropriate, and/or insubordinate and provide data 
demonstrating that emotionally strong, optimistic, and prosocial employees 
express anger at work, typically to the betterment of the organization.186 
The reverse is also clear in the research as studies of suppressed versus 
expressed anger overwhelmingly show a strong relationship between 
suppressed anger and negative workplace and relational outcomes.187  
Research on suppressed anger identifies problems both with silent anger, 
kept inside oneself, as well as anger that is “organizationally silent,” meaning 
it is displayed only to people unrelated to the incident, including sympathetic 
office mates.  When anger is kept silent and unspoken, also known as “anger-
in,”188 employees believe the benefits of keeping quiet outweigh the costs of 
speaking up.  They may decide the issue is not significant, not worth the 
hassle of a challenge, or too costly due to the potential for negative 
repercussions.  However, significant research is clear that efforts to hide 
negative emotion, especially when one wants to speak out,189 produce 
detrimental cognitive, psychological, and physiological effects.190  These can 
include rumination, where the person cannot remove the incident from his or 
 
 185.  See Lisa T. Stickney & Deanna Geddes, Positive, proactive, and committed: The 
surprising connection between good citizens and expressed (vs. suppressed) anger at work, 7 
NEGOT. AND CONFLICT MGMT. RES. 243 (2014) (outlining surprising connections between an 
employee’s expression of anger to workplace management and that employee’s commitment 
to the organization). 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id.  See also Lisa T. Stickney & Deanna Geddes, More than just “blowing off 
steam”: The roles of anger and advocacy in promoting positive outcomes at work 9 NEGOT. 
AND CONFLICT MGMT. RES. 141 (2016) (identifying whether advocacy on behalf of an upset 
coworker can improve workplace relations); Deanna Geddes & Lisa T. Stickney, Muted anger 
in the workplace: Changing the “sound” of employee emotion through social sharing, in 
EXPERIENCING AND MANAGING EMOTIONS IN THE WORKPLACE: RES. ON EMOTION IN 
ORGANIZATIONS 85 (Charmine E.J. Härtel Neal M. Ashkanasy, Wilfred J. Zerbe ed. 2012) 
(researching the relationship between anger intensity and organizational commitment and the 
likelihood of one employee to advocate for another). 
 188.  See generally Spielberger, Krasner, & Solomon, supra note 184. 
 189.  See JAMES W. PENNEBAKER, OPENING UP: THE HEALING POWER OF CONFIDING ON 
OTHERS (1990) (proposing that self-disclosure can lead to health benefits). 
 190.  See Jane M. Richards & James J. Gross, Composure at any cost? The cognitive 
consequences of emotion suppression, 25 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL. BULL. 1033 
(1999) (identifying negative health consequences of chronic emotional suppression). 
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her mind,
191
 feelings of humiliation or resentment,
192
 demoralization,
193
 and 
physical problems including raised blood pressure and heart disease.194 
Studies show that similarly negative consequences result from the other 
form of suppressed anger as well, where employees intentionally hide their 
anger from management (or those responsible for their frustration) and 
instead vent to sympathetic coworkers.  The dual threshold model labels this 
suppression “muted” or “muffled” anger.195  Research shows that such anger 
often causes “negative emotional contagion,” where the employee’s anger is 
transferred to others originally unaware of and uninvolved in the initial 
incident.196  This, in turn, can damage employee morale and raise indignation 
among sympathetic colleagues who support their coworker.197  Ironically, 
until management hears of the employees’ anger, the problematic situation 
remains unaddressed and unresolved and may, in fact, escalate.198 
The implications are clear:  Organizations and management benefit by 
recognizing that expressed anger by employees can promote favorable 
workplace outcomes.  As a consequence, it is ultimately beneficial to an 
organization to provide opportunities and even incentives for angry 
employees to come to management and speak up, rather than hide their anger 
or only share it with people unrelated to the problem who are not in a position 
to help make necessary changes at work.  Employees willing to approach 
management to express disapproval and indignation over perceived 
unethical, illegal, or insensitive practices or policies at work more often than 
not reflect a strong commitment to their company, their colleagues, and their 
work.199 
 
 191.  See Dianne M. Tice & Roy F. Baumeister, Controlling anger: Self-induced emotion 
change, in HANDBOOK OF MENTAL CONTROL 393 (Daniel M. Wegner & James W. Pennebaker 
eds., 1993) (discussing research and theories of how an individual’s mental state progresses 
or deteriorates when attempting to control anger). 
 192.  See generally Perlow & Williams, supra note 171. 
 193.  See Gina Vega & Debra R. Comer, Sticks and stones may break your bones, but 
words can break your spirit: Bullying in the workplace, 58 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 101 (2005) 
(identifying the negative effects of bullying in the workplace, both on individual mental 
wellbeing and organization productivity as a whole). 
 194.  See generally Begley, supra note 151. 
 195.  See generally Geddes & Callister, supra note 152. 
 196.  Sigal G. Barsade, The Ripple Effect: Emotional Contagion and Its Influence on 
Group Behavior, 47 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 644 (2002) (analyzing the phenomenon of a team of 
workers being more likely to share similar moods and its potential impact on performance). 
 197.  Callister, R. R., Geddes, D., & Gibson, D. E. 2017. When is anger helpful or hurtful? 
Status and role impact on anger expression and outcomes, 10(2) NEGOT. AND CONFLICT 
MGMT. RESEARCH, 69-87 (2017). 
 198.  See Stickney & Geddes (2014), supra note 187, at 252 (distinguishing beneficial 
instances of anger and expressions of anger from detrimental ones).  
 199.  Stickney & Geddes (2014), supra note 187, at 252.   
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B. Retaliation Doctrines’ Impact on Anger Expression 
Both the “reasonable belief” doctrine and the “manner of the complaint” 
doctrine have the effect of incentivizing anger suppression among 
employees.  In the first instance, it is clear that if complaints about biased 
conduct go unprotected — unless the employee is complaining about 
conduct that a court would consider to be unlawful — most employees who 
are untrained in the law will choose to remain silent, not wanting to risk 
demotion or termination without legal recourse.  Similarly, if an employee 
has to worry about becoming agitated, angry, or somehow disruptive  when 
complaining about harassment or discrimination and thus losing his right to 
retaliation protection, he will likely choose not to complain at all. 
1. Reasonable Belief Doctrine and Suppression 
 In terms of the “reasonable belief” doctrine, there are three likely 
potential outcomes once employees begin to understand that only a narrow 
portion of their complaints will be protected and that they cannot effectively 
predict when they are at risk: (1) employees may keep quiet, choosing not to 
tell anyone about the potentially discriminatory conduct, (2) they may tell 
their co-workers but not a supervisor, or (3) they may choose to report the 
conduct directly to a federal or state agency and bypass the employer’s 
internal investigation mechanisms. 
First, it is highly likely that employees will simply choose to remain 
silent in the face of a potential risk of adverse action without protection.  If, 
to be protected, an employee must be relatively certain that the conduct of 
which he is complaining would meet the legal definition of an unlawful 
employment practice as interpreted by the federal circuit in which he would 
bring his case, most of the time he will, and probably should, choose not to 
complain.  As the Court in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of 
Nashville & Davidson County, noted: 
If it were clear law that an employee who reported 
discrimination . . . could be penalized with no remedy, prudent 
employees would have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII 
offenses against themselves or against others.  This is no imaginary 
horrible given the documented indications that fear of retaliation 
is the leading reason why people stay silent instead of voicing their 
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concerns about bias and discrimination. 
200
 
Although the act of keeping silent in the face of harassment or 
discrimination may be a reasonable legal choice in light of the existing 
precedent, it will likely have a significant impact on the employee’s 
emotional life.  It is uncontroversial to imagine that anger (and humiliation, 
fear, frustration and a host of other negative emotions) is a likely result when 
one feels himself to be a victim of harassment or some other form of 
discriminatory conduct.  As a result, the choice not to complain also means 
that the employee is likely holding in his or her anger despite the negative 
effects.  This “anger-in” form of anger suppression does not mean that the 
anger dissipates or resolves.  On the contrary, the anger continues to 
negatively affect the employee’s mental and physical state regardless of the 
fact that it has been suppressed. 
Consider the following hypothetical situation:  A female employee 
endures sexual comments from her co-workers every few months.  The 
comments are directed at her and occasionally at other women and involve 
female body parts, sexual acts, and her co-workers’ sexual experiences.  
There is no physical touching, and her co-workers often have a playful tone 
and laugh briefly before returning to work.  The comments are infrequent — 
they do not come every day or even every week but are sporadic and 
unpredictable.  And yet, the comments begin to loom large in the employee’s 
psyche.  She is constantly waiting for the next comment, building up her 
defenses, imagining what she might say in response, steeling herself for what 
feels to her like an attack. 
This employee has seen something similar happen before.  Her 
colleague at her prior position in the company endured a similar situation 
involving racial comments.  But in that instance, the employee went to 
management to complain about the comments.  Management initially told 
him there would be an investigation but nothing much came of it.  Instead, 
at the mid-year review, the complaining employee was terminated, allegedly 
for coming late to work several times without an excuse.  When the employee 
filed suit for retaliation, his case was dismissed at summary judgment.  The 
female target of sexual comments cannot be sure that her own situation rises 
to the level of a hostile work environment (if she even knows that term) and, 
in fact, different courts would likely reach different conclusions when 
presented with the facts in her case.201 And so, recalling her colleague’s 
 
 200.  555 U.S. 271, 279 (2009) (citing Brake, supra note 8, at 20 (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 201.  See Gorod, supra note 134, at 1490 (finding that “[i]n determining whether conduct 
is ‘severe or pervasive,’ the Supreme Court has instructed the lower courts to consider ‘all the 
circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it 
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situation and the rejection in the courts, she chooses to do nothing about her 
own predicament. 
But her choice to remain silent has consequences of its own.  She 
becomes increasingly upset and angry, has trouble focusing on anything else, 
and eventually her work begins to suffer.  She misses deadlines, appears 
distracted and unfocused at meetings, and begins to avoid interactions with 
many of her colleagues despite the social nature of her work.  Her silence 
does nothing to dissipate her anger and, in fact, may actually allow it to grow, 
ultimately making her a far less effective worker and a troubled person.202  In 
addition to affecting her own mental state, the employee’s failure to express 
her anger means that management is either not aware of the inappropriate 
conduct or knows about it but assumes it is not negatively affecting 
employees.  Management thus allows it to continue, thereby tacitly signaling 
that it is acceptable behavior, which, in turn, leads other employees to act 
similarly, perpetuating and even growing the problem.203 
Alternatively, as a second possibility, instead of complaining to 
management or remaining silent, the employee who feels victimized by the 
sexual conduct may begin telling her co-workers about it.  She is, in essence, 
complaining to her equals rather than complaining to a superior who might 
be able to do something about the problem.  In other words, she is displaying 
the “muffled anger” form of suppression.  The employee’s co-workers, in 
turn, can do nothing to help but become upset on her behalf and begin to feel 
angry that they work in an environment where such behavior is tolerated.  
This “emotional contagion” then impacts the effectiveness of numerous 
workers and not just the initial victim.  The first two possibilities thus result 
in (1) an increase in anger and discontent, (2) possible spread of anger 
beyond the initial victim, and (3) a perception that the employer permits such 
discriminatory behavior, likely leading to more anger, more misconduct in 
the future, and eventually a culture permeated with bias and discontent. 
 
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’  Thus, the Court has tried to 
provide some guidance as to when conduct is unlawful, but that guidance hardly provides 
definitive answers as to how a court will rule in any given case.”). 
 202.  See infra text accompanying notes 204-06.  Victims of sexual harassment often 
report that they become focused on the harassment and find themselves unable to focus on or 
perform their work effectively at some point.  See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 
22 (1993) (holding that “[a] discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does 
not seriously affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will detract from 
employees’ job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them 
from advancing in their careers.”) (cited in Margaret E. Johnson, Avoiding Harm Otherwise”: 
Reframing Women Employees’ Responses to the Harms of Sexual Harassment, 80 TEMP. L. 
REV. 743, 770 (2007)). 
 203.  See supra text accompanying notes 181-83. 
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Finally, the third likely possible response in this scenario is that the 
employee, fearing repercussions for complaining internally, will seek to 
protect herself by complaining directly to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the equivalent state agency.204  Under 
the “participation clause” in Title VII’s retaliation provision, employees who 
file a charge or participate in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing are 
protected against retaliation, regardless of the merits of the underlying 
discrimination claim.205  While this option certainly provides a forum for the 
employee to channel her anger, it is likely not the most desirable option from 
the employer’s perspective.  Answering an EEOC charge requires time, 
resources, and potentially assistance from legal counsel.  The eventual 
litigation costs can grow quickly should the employee proceed with filing a 
lawsuit.206  It is far easier and more efficient for the employer to resolve 
situations internally and avoid the costs and demands of the agency and court 
systems. 
The first two possibilities—internal anger suppression and “muffled 
anger” — both have negative outcomes that compound the already harmful 
nature of discrimination in the workplace.  A number of commentators have 
explained the devastating impact of sexual harassment on its victims.  
“Sexual harassment harms its victims psychologically, physically, and 
financially, producing serious, even devastating, effects.  One commentator 
has gone so far as to liken it to a form of psychological pollution that corrodes 
the well-being of . . . [its] victims.”207  Similarly, Terry Smith describes the 
significant psychological and physical injury that results from racial 
discrimination.208  For example, she describes a study of black women who 
experienced “increased cardiovascular reactivity and emotional distress 
when confronted with racist provocation.”209 
 
 204.  Of course, as described in the Introduction, the employee may also make the choice 
to leave her job and subsequently take her complaints online.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 1-8.  A former employee tweeting and blogging about alleged discrimination can be a 
public relations nightmare for a company even without a lawsuit.  The benefit to handling 
such complaints internally should be obvious.  
 205.  42 U.S. Code § 2000e–3(a); Brake, supra note 8, at 79, n.201. 
 206.  See Jean Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment 
Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1423 (finding that 
“[f]rom the employer’s perspective, the litigation system is also quite problematic.  First, it is 
very time consuming and expensive, so that even those employers who believe they have valid 
defenses to claims of discrimination find they are paying a great deal in legal fees.”). 
 207.  Gorod, supra note 134, at 1513 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 208.  Smith, supra note 22, at 545-52. 
 209.  Smith, supra note 22, at 547 (citing Maya Dominguez et al., Effects of Racist 
Provocation and Social Support on Cardiovascular Reactivity in African American Women, 
2 INT’L J. BEHAV. MED. 321, 321-22 (1995)). 
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The harm that results from the underlying conduct is compounded when 
the victim feels the need to suppress his or her powerful emotional response 
to the biased conduct.  As Gorod notes, “if women come to believe that they 
cannot speak out about . . . harassment – that they cannot give voice to their 
feelings of frustration, anger, and fear – it seems reasonable to believe that 
those feelings, borne of the initial harassment but compounded by the forced 
silence, will manifest themselves in other, potentially destructive, ways.”210  
Smith describes a Harvard University and Kaiser Foundation study of 
working class black women and men that found just such destructive results 
when victims keep silent: 
Working-class black women who responded to discriminatory 
treatment by accepting it as inevitable and remaining silent about 
it posted higher blood pressure levels than those who tried to 
respond to unfair treatment and who shared their experiences with 
others.  Likewise, among working-class black men, those reporting 
that they usually accepted their unfair treatment as a fact of life 
reported higher systolic blood pressure than those who tried to 
respond to unfair treatment.211 
Moreover, it is clear from the psychological research described in the 
prior Section that we don’t need to imagine the harms caused by suppressed 
anger and emotion.  Those harms are real, having been studied and 
documented, and they take both psychological and physical forms and 
impact both the victims themselves as well as the workplace overall.212  Thus, 
while harassment and other forms of discrimination clearly take a severe toll 
on victims, the failure to fully protect those victims against retaliation and 
the victims’ resulting choices to remain silent and suppress the emotional 
responses to it has its own extremely detrimental impact on workers and the 
working environment. 
2. “Manner of the Complaint” Doctrine and Suppression 
As with the “reasonable belief” doctrine, courts’ proclivity to dismiss 
retaliation claims when the employer alleges insubordination as its legitimate 
reason for termination also has the effect of incentivizing suppression of 
anger in the workplace.  In addition, this approach tends to ignore 
psychological research on the contextual nature of anger and its acceptability 
 
 210.  Gorod, supra note 134, at 1515 (emphasis added). 
 211.  Smith, supra note 22, at 547 (citing Nancy Krieger & Stephen Sidney, Racial 
Discrimination and Blood Pressure: The CARDIA Study of Young Black and White Adults, 
86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1370, 1373-74 (1996)). 
 212.  See supra Part II. A. 
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in a variety of workplaces. 
First, and most importantly, the almost automatic dismissal of cases 
when insubordination is alleged creates a clear takeaway message for 
employees: unless you complain (about harassment, discrimination, or 
anything else) in the most respectful manner possible, you run a significant 
risk of losing your eventual retaliation claim because any disruptive behavior 
can be deemed unacceptable and grounds for termination without recourse 
in the law.  The suppression of anger that will likely result from this approach 
is clear.  Anger is a natural human emotion that often arises when we feel 
victimized by injustice.213  When employees begin to see that any display of 
anger may be used against them when making complaints, the reasonable 
response is to suppress all complaints in an attempt to suppress the emotions 
that will inevitably escape them.  If employees cannot trust themselves to 
complain without becoming angry, disruptive, or hostile, they will often 
choose to say nothing at all. 
As a secondary but still important matter, the way in which courts have 
approached the insubordination issue suggests that they are relying on 
“common sense” without considering the existing research on the way in 
which anger manifests, is tolerated, and is dealt with in the workplace.  
Recall the Seventh Circuit’s approach to an employer’s use of the 
insubordination defense in McClendon.  The court explicitly stated that it 
was “not relevant whether Mr. McClendon actually was insubordinate.”214  
Instead, the court was concerned only with the employer’s good faith belief 
that the employee’s behavior was unacceptable215  In the large majority of 
cases, courts, not wanting to question employers’ business judgment or delve 
too far into “the weeds,” simply accept the employer’s assertion that the 
determination of insubordination was legitimate.216  Thus, the mere 
allegation of insubordination is enough to defeat a retaliation claim.  In 
addition, several courts have made clear that the factors leading to the 
disruptive outburst are similarly irrelevant to the analysis.217  But as the 
Geddes and Stickney research demonstrates, the factors that contribute to a 
finding of deviant anger or anger that crosses the threshold from acceptable 
to unacceptable are not static nor does the determination lend itself to a single 
standard.218  Instead, that determination is different for every organization 
 
 213.  See supra Part II. A.  
 214.  McClendon, 108 F.3d at 799. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  See Carle, supra note 18, at 201-09 (outlining cases in which courts deferred to 
employer assertions of insubordination). 
 217.  Carle, supra note 18, at 201-09. 
 218.  See supra Part II.A. 
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and may, in fact, differ even within an organization depending on the context 
and dynamics that led to the particular outburst at issue.219 
Anger may be deemed deviant because the employee works in an 
environment that tolerates no emotional expressions at all, because the 
volume and tone of the expression exceeded the acceptable standards in a 
workplace that tolerates a moderate level of anger expression, or because the 
factors leading to the outburst do not justify the type of expression.220  The 
notion that courts should blindly accept an employer’s subjective assessment 
that the employee was insubordinate without consideration of what made the 
expression “deviant” ignores the reality of workplace cultures.  To deprive a 
worker of retaliation protection without consideration of the context of the 
outburst is irresponsible at best.  It feels particularly egregious in cases of 
discrimination where the impact on the employee may be profound and 
should not be ignored.  As Terry Smith has pointed out, 
Courts cannot intelligently evaluate the permissible bounds of 
opposition conduct without some appreciation of the nature of the 
harm the employee is opposing.  Concomitantly, courts cannot 
properly assess opposition conduct without an understanding of 
the effects of perceived discrimination on the minority worker and, 
thus, the psychological and physiological factors that inform and 
shape his opposition conduct.221 
C. Using the Dual Threshold Model as a Guide to Reforming 
Retaliation Doctrine 
The Geddes/Callister dual threshold model of workplace anger reaches 
several important conclusions that are relevant to retaliation doctrine.  First, 
the overall conclusion that the expression of anger in the workplace is 
generally positive both for the individual and for the workplace as a whole 
should impact employers’ views of the incentive structure created by existing 
legal doctrine and precedents.  Second, the emphasis on the contextual nature 
of anger and varying degrees of anger acceptance should impact the way in 
which courts approach cases involving angry employees.  What follows is a 
proposal to reform the two retaliation doctrines discussed above in a way 
that should serve the goals of Title VII, allow for more context-based and 
nuanced legal conclusions, and yield healthier workplaces.  It bears repeating 
that although the health and culture of a workplace is not the concern of Title 
VII, it is, or should be, the concern of employers.  As a result, consideration 
 
 219.  See supra Part II.A. 
 220.  See supra text accompanying notes 152-53. 
 221.  Smith, supra note 22, at 545. 
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of the dual threshold model should push employers to support changes to 
retaliation doctrine that workers’ advocates have been promoting for some 
time. 
1. Court-Created Doctrines and Reforms 
Before delving into our reform proposal, it is important to point out that 
the doctrines and approaches discussed in this article are entirely court 
created.  There is nothing in the statutory language of Title VII or other anti-
discrimination statutes that compels courts to define protected opposition 
conduct as requiring that the employee possess an “objectively reasonable 
belief” that the conduct about which he is complaining would be viewed as 
unlawful by the relevant court.222  As Deborah Brake has pointed out, 
The standard explanation for the tighter requirement applied to 
Title VII retaliation claims under the opposition clause is that 
Congress did not write the opposition clause to encompass as 
broad a level of protection as afforded under the participation 
clause.  However, the use of the reasonable belief doctrine does 
not follow from any linguistic differences between the two clauses, 
but rather from a desire to protect employer prerogatives to 
retaliate against persons who raise complaints in the workplace 
that stray too far from dominant legal understandings of 
discrimination.223 
As a result, the incentives and practical reality created by this court-
created standard can and should be considered by courts when deciding 
whether and how to apply it. 
Similarly, the approach courts take in insubordination cases is not based 
on any statutory imperative.224  The decision to consider insubordination as 
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination or to conclude that the 
manner in which an employee complained about discrimination exceeded 
the bounds of reasonableness and thus left him unprotected against 
retaliation is a creation of courts alone.  Thus, as Susan Carle notes with 
respect to her proposals on this issue, “the reforms suggested do not require 
major statutory reforms but instead doctrinal tweaks that courts can make in 
 
 222.  See Brake, supra note 8, at 102-03 (finding that “[h]aving recognized that protection 
of oppositional activities is not limited to complaints about practices that are actually illegal, 
there is nothing in the language of Title VII’s opposition clause that requires courts to use a 
reasonable belief standard as the boundary for such claims, and certainly not one bounded to 
dominant judicial interpretations of current legal precedent.”). 
 223.  Brake, supra note 8, at 103, n.293 (citing Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 
1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
 224.  See Carle, supra note 18, at 210 (noting tweaks to the doctrine made by the courts). 
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exercising their interstitial interpretative power in applying law to facts.”
225
 
2. History of Considering Incentives in Creating Employment 
Doctrine 
In addition to reforms being somewhat straightforward in this area since 
statutory changes are unnecessary, reforms of these doctrines based on 
consideration of the incentives they create should also fit with courts’ general 
approach and concerns in the Title VII arena.  Courts assessing Title VII 
cases have, for decades, been interested in the incentive structures that flow 
from the extra-statutory doctrines they create. 
This incentives-focused concern is perhaps most evident in the 
Ellerth/Faragher cases in which the Supreme Court created an affirmative 
defense to Title VII discrimination claims in order to incentivize certain 
behavior on the part of employers.  In Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth,226 
the plaintiff alleged sexual harassment at the hands of a mid-level manager 
who made offensive remarks and gestures, including threats to deny her 
tangible job benefits.227  Similarly, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,228 a 
lifeguard employed by the city alleged sexual harassment by two of her 
immediate male supervisors.229  The Court established in these cases that an 
employer could be liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment by 
a supervisor even when no tangible employment action is taken against the 
alleged victim of harassment.230  Most importantly, for our purposes, in these 
cases, the Supreme Court also created (without any statutory requirement) 
an affirmative defense to sexual harassment claims that looked to “the 
reasonableness of the employer’s conduct as well as that of a plaintiff 
victim.”231  More specifically, the Court held that a “defending employer may 
raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages” by demonstrating “(a) 
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly 
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”232  The 
primary motivation for creating this affirmative defense was a desire to 
incentivize specific behavior on the part of employers, as made clear in 
 
 225.  Carle, supra note 18, at 210. 
 226.  524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 227.  Id. at 747-48. 
 228.  524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 229.  Id. at 780. 
 230.  Id. at 765. 
 231.  Id. at 780. 
 232.  Id. at 808. 
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Ellerth: 
Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment 
policies and effective grievance mechanisms.  Were employer 
liability to depend in part on an employer’s effort to create such 
procedures, it would effect Congress’ intention to promote 
conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context. . . . To 
the extent limiting employer liability could encourage employees 
to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive, 
it would also serve Title VII’s deterrent purpose.233 
The Court in Faragher further provided: 
It would . . . implement clear statutory policy and complement the 
Government’s Title VII enforcement efforts to recognize the 
employer’s affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give 
credit here to employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge 
their duty.  Indeed, a theory of vicarious liability for misuse of 
supervisory power would be at odds with the statutory policy if it 
failed to provide employers with some such incentive.234 
It is clear from the Ellerth/Faragher opinions that the Court is not only 
concerned with the real-world consequences of its conclusions but that the 
way in which its doctrines impact employer and employee behavior is a 
primary concern that, in fact, motivates doctrinal innovations. 
In the context of retaliation doctrine, the Supreme Court made a similar 
incentive-based determination when defining the term “adverse employment 
action” for purposes of retaliation suits.  In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe 
Railway v. White,235 the Court considered what standard should apply when 
determining whether adverse conduct constituted possible retaliation.236  The 
Court determined that the definition of adverse conduct in the retaliation 
context should be different from that in the discrimination context.  Whereas 
in discrimination cases, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct he 
complains of constitutes “a significant change  in employment status, such 
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different 
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits,”237  in 
the retaliation context, the Court adopted a broader standard under which “a 
plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the 
challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well 
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 
 
 233.  524 U.S. at 764. 
 234.  524 U.S. at 806. 
 235.  548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
 236.  Id. at 69-70. 
 237.  Id. at 75-76 (Alito, J. concurring). 
EISENSTADT & GEDDES_FINAL_EIC ADJUSTMENTS - COPY (DO NOT DELETE) 9/27/2018  3:20 PM 
194 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20.1 
 
 
charge of discrimination.”
238
  
In explaining this different approach, the Court focused on the real-
world impact of the standard it applies.  “By focusing on the materiality of 
the challenged action and the perspective of a reasonable person in the 
plaintiff’s position, we believe this standard will screen out trivial conduct 
while effectively capturing those acts that are likely to dissuade employees 
from complaining or assisting in complaints about discrimination.”239  The 
Court recognized that the way in which it defined “adverse action” would 
either have the effect of encouraging or deterring complaints about 
discrimination and chose the course that would encourage employees to 
come forward.240 
These significant decisions reinforce the importance of the real-world 
impact of employment doctrine on the creation of those doctrines.  Absent 
clear statutory direction, courts consistently look to the incentive structures 
created by their conclusions and to the behavior of employers and employees 
that are desirable and likely to result from their decisions.  In something akin 
to a “legal realism” approach, courts in the employment context often seek 
“to understand legal rules in terms of their social consequences.”241  It is in 
this context that we suggest doctrinal reform of the retaliation doctrines 
discussed in this article and that we propose consideration of the impact these 
doctrines have on employee health and workplace culture. 
3. Employer-Employee Alignment of Interests 
While consideration of incentives is a regular component of doctrinal 
discussions in the Title VII context, it is less common to find a doctrinal 
 
 238.  Id. at 68 (internal quotations omitted). 
 239.  Id. at 69-70. 
 240.  Id. at 69.  Interestingly, the Court also noted the way in which the real-world behavior 
it was focused on could itself have varied meanings and impacts depending on context.  
“Context matters.  The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a 
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not 
fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.  A 
schedule change in an employee’s work schedule may make little difference to many workers, 
but may matter enormously to a young mother with school age children.  A supervisor’s 
refusal to invite an employee to lunch is normally trivial, a nonactionable petty slight.  But to 
retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch that contributes significantly 
to the employee’s professional advancement might well deter a reasonable employee from 
complaining about discrimination.”   
 241.  See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 468-69 
(1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)) (holding 
that judges hope to make decisions more predictable by focusing on both the specific facts of 
cases, and social reality in general).  
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proposal that has benefits for both employers and employees alike.  Our 
proposal to reform specific retaliation doctrines to incentivize anger 
expression does just that.  The benefits to workers are obvious in that 
expanded protection from retaliation ultimately encourages more workers to 
come forward with complaints, increasing the efficacy of the 
antidiscrimination laws in protecting workers.  As we have discussed above, 
although it may seem counterintuitive, employers also ultimately benefit 
from an environment in which workers feel comfortable coming forward and 
expressing their anger and distress. 
We have focused on the organizational behavior research on workplace 
anger expression but this notion of a healthy workplace culture that supports 
complaints and emotional expression is already beginning to take hold 
among business leaders and advisors.  From the perspective of litigation 
avoidance, corporate counsel generally recognize the benefits of early 
complaints that allow for conciliation or some form of alternative dispute 
resolution rather than costly court battles.242  As Deborah Thompson 
Eisenberg points out in her recent article, the increasing effort at conciliation 
has also grown out of “dramatic changes in the structure of many 
organizations” from top-down hierarchies to “team-based work” that spreads 
out the control and decision making authority243  Given this new 
organizational structure, employers must take new steps to attract and retain 
talent including developing “conflict management systems that give 
employees a greater sense of empowerment, voice, and self-determination in 
addressing workplace issues.”244 
Corporate counsel and compliance professionals also point out that to 
limit or eliminate bad behavior in the workplace, employers must focus on 
more than policies and complaint systems and should turn their attention to 
workplace culture.  As corporate consultants advise: 
The only thing that can prevent corporate misconduct is an 
 
 242.  See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, The Restorative Workplace: An Organizational 
Learning Approach to Discrimination 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 487, 490 (citing SEYFARTH 
SHAW, LLP, ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION LITIGATION REPORT 3 (2014 
ed.), http://www.seyfarth-classaction.com/2014/2014wcar/index.html.)) [https://perma.cc
/88BK-V6WY] (finding that when an employee raises a concern or, even worse, files a lawsuit 
alleging discrimination or harassment, a highly disruptive and expensive prospect occurs). 
 243.  Id. at 491.  
 244.  Id. (citing KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT 
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 174–83 (2004); David B. Lipsky & Ariel C. 
Avgar, Toward a Strategic Theory of Workplace Conflict Management, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 143, 153-54 (2008); DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR 
MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR 
MANAGERS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS 68 (2003)).   
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employee base that’s not afraid to speak up when it sees something 
amiss.  If misconduct is immediately called out, it will stop.  The 
solution is an open and transparent culture.  But in trying to defeat 
misbehavior, companies ignore culture and mistakenly focus on 
policies, processes and systems instead.  These things have little 
impact.  Our research shows this conclusively:  Only humans can 
identify a social problem, and it turns out that policies have very 
little influence on human behavior.  We’re looking in the wrong 
place for the solution to corporate misconduct.  The solution is 
culture.245 
A culture in which complaints receive no meaningful response 
encourages employees to remain silent rather than expose themselves to the 
vulnerabilities of speaking up.  The cycle then becomes difficult to break — 
“Silence begets misconduct, misconduct begets more silence.”246  Of course, 
any corporate attempts to change workplace culture and to encourage 
employees to come forward will likely be stymied by a legal regime that 
promotes the opposite behavior and incentivizes silence and suppression.  If 
courts ultimately protect retaliatory conduct, it will be far more difficult to 
convince stakeholders to make real and lasting institutional change.  
Employers should favor changes in retaliation doctrine to support the 
forward thinking changes they are already beginning to make in their 
workplaces.247  As a result, the proposals we make here that have obvious 
benefits to workers also positively impact their employers and corporate 
efforts to create healthier workplaces overall. 
4. Proposal: Flipping the Standards 
This Article proposes that courts reconsider the standards they apply to 
complaining employees under the two doctrines discussed.  Our proposals 
are not significantly different than those suggested by other scholars.  But, 
in contrast to most commentators, who have considered only one or the other 
of the doctrines, our analysis of the two doctrines together lends itself to a 
reform proposal that highlights their relationship. 
In looking at the two doctrines side by side, we focus on two aspects of 
 
 245.  Dan Currell and Aaron Kotok, Preventing Bad Behavior at Your Company, 
CORPORATE COUNSEL (March 17, 2015), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=12027208281
60/Preventing-Bad-Behavior-at-Your-Company [https://perma.cc/32MJ-UZEV]. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Eisenberg points to Southwest Airlines and Ford as companies that have begun to 
make these changes.  See Eisenberg, supra note 242, at 8 (arguing that Southwest Airlines 
now promotes middle managers based in part on “their ability to spark vigorous but respectful 
internal debates). 
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the court-created approaches:  (1) the objective or subjective nature of the 
standard applied or, in other words, whether the standard requires 
“reasonableness” or “good faith” and (2) the actor to whom the standard is 
applied — employee or employer.  In the first instance, the problematic 
component of the “reasonable belief” doctrine is that it applies an objective 
standard to the question of an employee’s belief that the conduct he 
complained about was unlawful.  As described previously, courts do not ask 
whether the employee honestly believed that the behavior was unlawful, nor 
do they consider whether the employee held an objectively reasonable belief 
that the conduct was offensive or inappropriate, necessitating a simple 
common-sense judgment.  Rather, the court’s only concern is whether it was 
objectively reasonable to conclude that the behavior was unlawful, a 
determination that requires a legal analysis to determine how a court in that 
circuit would view the underlying conduct.  In contrast, when faced with a 
claim of insubordination, courts explicitly reject any kind of reasonableness 
standard, focusing instead on the honest belief of the employer that the 
employee’s conduct or manner in complaining was inappropriate.  As the 
Seventh Circuit in Clack made abundantly clear, “[A]rguing about the 
accuracy of the employer’s assessment is [merely] a distraction because the 
question is not whether the employer’s reasons for a decision are right but 
whether the employer’s description of its reasons is honest.”248 
Because our focus is on maximizing the productive expression of 
workplace anger by employees, the solution we propose is aimed at 
incentivizing anger expression by giving workers a sense of comfort in those 
expressions.  This, in turn, will create a healthier workplace culture in which 
workers feel secure coming forward to complain about bias or any other 
workplace problems.  If the goal is maximizing worker comfort, the solution 
should be the flipping of the two standards: employees should be held to an 
honest belief standard when complaining about behavior that they believe is 
unlawful discrimination whereas employers should be held to an objectively 
reasonable standard when concluding that an employee’s behavior crossed 
the line from productive expression into insubordination in light of the 
context and workplace culture in which the expression occurred. 
There are numerous reasons to reverse the standards so that employees 
are held to a good faith or honest belief standard and employers to an 
objective reasonableness standard.  First, from a common-sense perspective, 
there is a distinct imbalance in terms of access to legal information between 
employees and their employers.  Employers generally have far easier access 
 
 248.  Clack, 304 F.App’x at 406 (quoting Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th 
Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted)). 
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to legal counsel, whether in-house or external, than do average employees.
249
  
As a result, when making termination decisions in insubordination cases, 
employers may and often do consult with attorneys to confirm that the 
planned termination does not run afoul of anti-discrimination laws and 
regulations.250  Application of an objective reasonableness standard would 
require employers and their attorneys to assess the decision as part of their 
overall consideration of the propriety of the termination.  Objective 
reasonableness necessitates something more than a gut reaction, instead 
requiring a consideration of the context of the employee’s conduct, the 
culture of the workplace overall, and the factors that led to the employee’s 
outburst.  This is not a particularly onerous task to begin with but is made far 
simpler by consulting with counsel who have likely seen similar occurrences 
in the past and are familiar with courts’ views on reasonable behavior in this 
context.251 
In contrast, employees deciding whether and when to complain about 
perceived discrimination rarely have access to legal advice of any kind.252  
Faced with the task of determining alone whether the conduct of which they 
are complaining constitutes unlawful conduct, the wise employee will 
choose to keep silent rather than risk lawful termination or demotion in 
retaliation for the complaint.  As the dissent in Boyer-Liberto pointed out, 
“An employee is not an expert in hostile work environment law.”253  Even 
without legal counsel, however, employees can feel comfortable basing their 
actions on their “honest” beliefs.  As a result, imposing a subjective or good 
faith standard on employee complaints would create an environment in 
 
 249.  See Lisa Bernt, Tailoring a Consent Inquiry to Fit Individual Employment Contracts, 
63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 31, 44 (2012) (holding that employers typically have legal counsel to 
help them sort out the complexities of employment law, but few employees or job applicants 
have meaningful access to reliable information or advice regarding the laws that govern their 
livelihood). 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  There is precedent for applying an objective reasonableness standard in 
insubordination cases.  In at least two cases involving an employee who was fired for 
physically striking someone in the workplace, courts have assessed the reasonableness of the 
plaintiff’s conduct considering the circumstances surrounding the incident.  See Folkerson v. 
Circus Circus Enters., 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 30137, *13-14 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
when assessing retaliation and sex discrimination claims of a mime who struck a patron who 
touched her and was fired, the court considered the “reasonableness” of her conduct under the 
circumstances); Speed, 93 F. Supp. 3d at 361 (finding that the court assessed the conduct of a 
plaintiff who struck her harasser by considering surrounding circumstances and the plaintiff’s 
viewpoint). 
 252.  Bernt, supra note 249, at 44. 
 253.  Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 290. See also Bernt, supra note 248, at 44 (finding that 
studies show that employees are systematically uninformed about their rights, lacking the 
most basic knowledge about the law of the workplace). 
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which employees can “feel safe and secure in bringing an incident . . . to the 
attention of management.”254 
Beyond the imbalance in access to legal counsel, a reversal of the 
standards would also recognize the dangers in removing the employee’s 
perception of discrimination from the analysis.  It is well documented that 
racial and gender identity can significantly impact an individual’s perception 
of reasonableness or the existence of discrimination in a given situation.255  
For example, Russell Robinson’s article Perceptual Segregation 
convincingly argues that insiders and outsiders (or members of majority and 
minority identities) “tend to perceive allegations of discrimination through 
fundamentally different psychological frameworks.”256  Robinson points to 
a “growing body of empirical evidence on how outsiders anticipate 
discrimination, perceive that they are being discriminated against, and then 
attempt to manage discrimination.”257  While courts have primarily focused 
on the mental state of employers, the alleged perpetrators of discrimination, 
Robinson highlights the viewpoint of victims and the dramatic differences in 
how victims of discrimination understand comments or conduct as 
discriminatory.258  With this in mind, the notion that an employee can be 
 
 254.  Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 290. 
 255.  See generally Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, and Donald Braman, Whose Eyes 
Are You Going to Believe? Scott V. Harris and The Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 838 (2009) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s determination of “reasonable” 
behavior in high speed chase video that conflicts with minority population’s perception of 
events in video). 
 256.  Russell Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (2009). 
 257.  Id. at 1103. 
 258.  Id. at 1102-03.  As an example, Robinson suggests the following hypothetical: 
“Imagine that I conducted an experiment in which I randomly selected ten white people and 
ten black people and asked them to watch a scenario involving potential discrimination.  The 
setting is a mostly white, fancy restaurant situated in a suburb at 8:00 pm on a Saturday. The 
only all-black party is an African American family, which is seated near the back of the 
restaurant. The parents try in vain several times to flag down the waiters to ask for menus and 
to order food. This goes on for ten minutes. Perceptual segregation theory predicts that if we 
asked our ten black and ten white people whether it is likely that race played a factor in the 
restaurant staff failing to attend to the black family, the black participants would be 
significantly more likely to reply that race was a factor.  Specifically, the black participants 
would tend to recognize, recall, and consider different information than the white participants.  
For instance, the blacks might be keenly aware that the restaurant is dominated by white staff 
and patrons and the black family was seated near the back, while the white participants might 
say that they did not even notice race or think that the placement of the family’s table might 
have correlated with race.  The black participants might also take note that this is an upscale 
restaurant in a wealthy suburb, where black patrons might be relatively unusual, and 
potentially less welcome.  By contrast, the white participants might focus on a race-neutral 
explanation:  the fact that the incident occurred during prime dinner hours on a weekend and 
the possibility that the staff may have just been busy, rather than racially motivated.”  Id. at 
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judged on whether he or she possessed an “objectively reasonable” belief 
that unlawful discrimination has occurred seems overly simplistic.  When it 
comes to assessing the existence of discrimination in particular, “reasonable 
belief” is deeply connected to the identity of the believer.259 
Finally, and most importantly, reversal of the standards used in these 
doctrines would incentivize the type of anger expression that yields healthier 
workplaces.  From the perspective of an employer who wants to create a 
workplace culture in which employees feel free to come forward with good 
faith complaints in the hopes of addressing problems early, it clearly makes 
sense to impose an “honest belief” or “good faith” standard on opposition 
conduct.  In other words, if an employee can demonstrate that he honestly 
believed that the conduct about which he was complaining rose to the level 
of unlawful discrimination, he will be assured of legal protection against 
retaliation.  The feeling of security that would flow from such an approach 
cannot be underestimated.  An employee need not know or seek out a 
detailed understanding of discrimination precedents in his circuit to benefit.  
He need only have a general understanding of the protections available under 
law and make a sincere assessment about whether the conduct or comments 
he endured violate the law. 
Such increased comfort would likely also result from application of an 
objective reasonableness standard to employers’ decisions to terminate 
based on insubordination.  In contrast to the existing “honest belief” 
standard, an objective standard would require the court to seek out more than 
the employer’s point of view.  It would necessitate consideration of the 
context of the employee’s expression, the employee’s viewpoint, and the 
circumstances that gave rise to the incident.  For example, several courts 
have conducted such an analysis in cases in which employers claim that the 
plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of retaliation because she did 
not engage in protected opposition conduct, reasoning that the angry or 
physical outburst was not “reasonable” opposition conduct and was thus 
unprotected.  This was the case in Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enterprises, 
 
1118. 
 259.  See also Gorod, supra note 134, at 1495-96 (noting that “[s]tudies have shown that 
there is a gender gap in the definition of sexual harassment.  In general, women have a broader, 
more inclusive definition of sexual harassment and are more likely than men to view mild 
social sexual behavior as sexual harassment.  These studies not only support the idea that 
popular understandings of sexual harassment often differ from the legal definition, but they 
also suggest an additional reason not to employ the “reasonable juror” standard in determining 
what conduct is protected under Title VII.  After all, if women tend to have a broader view of 
what conduct constitutes sexual harassment, then women, one of the groups Title VII was 
intended to protect, will be most likely to get caught in the gap between what members of the 
public may view as reasonable and what the law does.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
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in which the plaintiff, a mime hired to perform as a mechanical doll, struck 
a patron (with a stuffed animal) after he came toward her with arms 
outstretched and touched her shoulder.260  The employer reviewed a video 
tape of the incident and terminated the plaintiff on the spot, concluding that 
her behavior was inappropriate.261  The argument made by the employer was 
not that the plaintiff was fired for insubordination but rather that she lacked 
an actionable retaliation claim because “physical violence can never 
constitute protected opposition to unlawful discrimination.”262  In other 
words, the employer claimed that the plaintiff’s striking of the patron could 
not constitute protected opposition conduct.  In assessing the reasonableness 
of the employee’s behavior on this case, the Ninth Circuit considered the 
surrounding circumstances and the employee’s point of view: 
Folkerson was miming a mechanical doll when a man began to 
come toward her, repeatedly asking whether she was real.  An 
employee at a nearby rental car booth repeatedly told the man not 
to touch Folkerson.  The man refused to listen.  Rather, he came 
toward Folkerson in an aggressive manner with both arms 
outstretched as though he was going to put his arms around her and 
squeeze her.  He succeeded in touching her shoulder.  Not wanting 
to break out of character, Folkerson raised her arm, in which she 
held a stuffed animal, to keep the man away.  In so doing, she hit 
him in the mouth.  The man laughed and the audience applauded.  
Based on this evidence, Folkerson’s conduct appears proportionate 
to the degree of threat this man posed.263 
This is essentially the approach we recommend in insubordination cases 
as well – consideration of the circumstances that led to the angry outburst 
and an attempt to view the scenario from all relevant perspectives, not just 
the employer’s.  This more global approach would undoubtedly create a 
greater sense of security in employees.  Knowing that any expressions of 
anger would be evaluated based on the “totality of circumstances” and would 
not be accepted by a court as per se grounds for termination (if the employer 
argued that it was insubordinate) should alleviate concerns that all anger can 
be lawfully punished and lead to greater willingness on the part of employees 
to speak up without fear of lawful retribution should the complaint come out 
in some loud, hostile, or assertive manner. 
In sum, applying a good faith standard to employees and a 
reasonableness standard to employers, in addition to embodying a fairer 
 
 260.  1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 30137, at *5 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 1995). 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  Id. at *12. 
 263.  Id. at *13-14. 
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approach in keeping with the goals of Title VII, would also incentivize anger 
expressions, lead to healthier workers and workplace cultures, and benefit 
both workers and employers. 
III.      OBSTACLES TO REFORM AND RESPONSES 
A. The Courts and Workplace Culture 
We anticipate that upon considering our proposal to reform retaliation 
doctrine in the interest of creating healthier workplaces, a likely argument in 
response will be that Title VII and the courts that enforce it have no business 
considering workplace culture, employee emotional and physical health, or 
any aspects of workplace management beyond elimination of discrimination.  
Our response to this argument is twofold.  First, as we have already alluded 
to, our goal in making this proposal is not to suggest that courts will be 
convinced to change retaliation doctrine on this basis.  In fact, articulation of 
the doctrines’ negative consequences for workplace anger expression should 
not be necessary for courts to implement this change.  Existing scholarship 
already adequately lays out the ways in which the doctrines we discuss 
impede the goals of Title VII, and those arguments alone should be sufficient 
reason for courts to consider rectifying the problems.264  Our purpose instead 
is to highlight for employers the negative consequences for workplace health 
and productivity that also result from the existing doctrinal regime.  As 
employers increasingly focus on creating non-hierarchical, team-based 
structures, encouraging meaningful debate as a means of promoting 
innovation and worker satisfaction, and developing procedures and 
mechanisms for employees to express their opinions and make complaints, 
it is important to point out the ways in which the law, as it currently stands, 
hinders these important developments.  It is our hope that employers will 
support doctrinal reform in this area because, despite the fact that reform 
would benefit workers by increasing retaliation protection and encouraging 
more complaints of discrimination, it would likewise benefit employers’ 
bottom lines. 
Second, we must point out that despite workplace health being beyond 
the purview of Title VII and the courts, judges are already considering these 
issues when discussing retaliation doctrine.  Unfortunately, in doing so, 
judges often rely on their common-sense evaluation of a situation when 
reference to extensive social science research would provide a better 
understanding of the incentives and likely consequences of their decisions.  
 
 264.  See supra Part I.C. 
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For example, in Boyer-Liberto, Judge Wilkinson’s opinion, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, voices concern about any attempts to turn the 
“reasonable belief” standard into a subjective rather than objective one.265  
Judge Wilkinson is concerned both with undermining free speech values in 
the workplace and with what he perceives will be detrimental consequences 
for co-worker relationships.  Without any citation to social science research, 
Wilkinson opines that “[t]urning someone in as a course of first resort or on 
insubstantial grounds may perpetuate resentment and bring the prospect of 
employee dialogue to a premature end.”266  He further contends that a 
subjective standard that protects a greater swath of employee complaints will 
unnaturally hamper co-worker communication across races and sexes: 
In an ideal world, the races and sexes would interact 
spontaneously, in natural and creative ways. . . . Title VII must not 
contribute an added element of inhibition when we communicate 
with those of another sex or race.  And yet I fear that is precisely 
what will happen if the objectively reasonable standard is diluted 
in favor of retaliation protection for any report, however marginal, 
trivial, or unsubstantiated. . . . [W]here every ambiguous or 
unintentionally insensitive remark is going to be reported upstairs, 
employees naturally will seek to cluster with those who look, act, 
and think “like themselves.”  Instead of an interactive community 
in which individual attributes can be recognized, understood, 
celebrated, and embraced, the result will be a more fractious and 
walled-off working environment where noxious stereotypes 
persist. Keeping interracial distance and maintaining interracial 
silence will become the safest course, the easiest way to avoid a 
blot on one’s record that comes even with a co-worker’s erroneous 
report.267 
Again, the judge made these comments based on his own sense of 
interpersonal dynamics without reference to any social science research 
despite the fact that a great deal of work has been done in this area.268  The 
research we discuss in this article itself demonstrates that speaking up and 
reporting distressing incidents and comments whether or not they amount to 
actionable discrimination actually creates a healthier more expressive culture 
and not the opposite.  Openly discussing troubling incidents brings workers 
closer rather than silencing and isolating them further. 
Similarly, in discussing free speech values in the workplace, Judge 
 
 265.  Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 290-91. 
 266.  Id. at 292. 
 267.  Id. at 293. 
 268.  See supra Part II.A. 
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Wilkinson makes an assumption about co-worker interactions that flies in 
the face of the research on anger expression.  He contends that “[w]orkplaces 
in their own way are our town squares. John talking to Kathy may prove in 
the end more fruitful than John running to a higher authority to have Kathy’s 
point-of-view condemned.”269  But as the Geddes and Stickney research 
demonstrates, John talking to Kathy about his anger rather than reporting it 
is a form of suppressed or muted anger that does not solve the problem but 
rather causes it to grow and spread.270  Our secondary goal in drawing 
connections between retaliation doctrine and research on workplace anger is 
thus to educate lawyers and the judiciary about this well-established body of 
research that studies the actual impacts of the doctrines and theories 
embodied in cases.  When establishing court-created doctrinal standards 
based on policy considerations around the real-world impact these doctrines 
have, it behooves parties and courts to reference that research. 
B. Widespread Increase in Litigation and Frivolous Claims 
Given critiques of other proposals to expand retaliation protection, it is 
likely that the other major concern about our proposal is the supposed 
increase in litigation over minor workplace tussles and a rise in frivolous 
complaints made in order to protect one’s job by obtaining retaliation 
protection.  These related concerns are based on misunderstandings of the 
impact of retaliation doctrine. 
First, the concern about an overall increase in litigation emerges from 
the notion that employees who are protected against retaliation when 
complaining about any comment or incident will thus complain far more 
often and ultimately sue more often.  If they feel entitled to complain about 
everything, the argument goes, they will also be empowered to bring their 
complaints to court.  This was exactly the critique raised by the dissent in 
Boyer-Liberto when the Fourth Circuit expanded its definition of a 
“reasonable belief” that a hostile work environment was being created.271  
The dissent warned that the new standard “will generate widespread 
litigation over the many offensive workplace comments made every day that 
employees find to be humiliating.”272  But, as the majority points out in that 
case, litigation will only occur if employees are discharged or otherwise 
punished for complaints.  “Our standard is implicated solely when an 
 
 269.  Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 292. 
 270.  See supra Part II.A. 
 271.  Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 304. 
 272.  Id. 
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employee suffers retaliation for engaging in an oppositional activity.”
273
  In 
other words, if employers heed the research we present here on anger 
expression in the workplace and are focused on creating more open and 
engaged workplace cultures, they will likewise be educating management 
not to react punitively to complaints whether or not they rise to the level of 
actionable discrimination.  That education, more than anything else, will 
lower the number of discrimination claims regardless of the nature of the 
underlying workplace incident.  As a result, providing legal protection 
against retaliation simply buttresses an already wise and fiscally beneficial 
approach to complaints. 
Second, and relatedly, there will likely be concern that expansion to a 
“good faith” standard for providing retaliation protection to employee 
complaints about discrimination will result in an expansion of fake or 
frivolous complaints made in order to secure job protection.  The notion here 
is that an employee who suspects that her job is in jeopardy for whatever 
reason will be incentivized to make a complaint about alleged discrimination 
in order to make it more difficult for the employer to terminate or take other 
adverse actions against her since that will give rise to a retaliation claim as 
well.  This concern was raised by Justice Kennedy in University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar in which the Supreme Court 
considered whether plaintiffs should be required to meet a “but for” standard 
for retaliation claims.274  The Court seemed to focus on this concern both at 
oral argument and in the decision itself.275 
[L]essening the causation standard could also contribute to the 
filing of frivolous claims, which would siphon resources from 
efforts by employer, administrative agencies, and courts to combat 
workplace harassment.  Consider in this regard the case of an 
employee who knows that he or she is about to be fired for poor 
performance, given a lower pay grade, or even just transferred to 
a different assignment or location.  To forestall that lawful action, 
he or she might be tempted to make an unfounded charge of racial, 
sexual, or religious discrimination; then, when the unrelated 
employment action comes, the employee could allege that it is 
retaliation.  If respondent were to prevail in his argument here, that 
claim could be established by a lessened causation standard, all in 
order to prevent the undesired change in employment 
 
 273.  Id. at 287-88. 
 274.  133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013).  See also Sandra F. Sperino and Suja A. Thomas, 
Fakers and Floodgates, 10 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 223, 224 (2014) (discussing the standard for 
retaliation claims).  
 275.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, 45-48, Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 
133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013). 
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circumstances.  Even if the employer could escape judgment after 
trial, the lessened causation standard would make it far more 
difficult to dismiss dubious claims at the summary judgment 
stage.276 
However, as at least one scholar has pointed out, the Court’s concern 
about employees with such ill motives was based on nothing more than pure 
conjecture.  Michael Zimmer took issue specifically with Justice Kennedy’s 
point about frivolous lawsuits, noting that 
The Court’s opinion does not cite any cases that involved facts like 
the hypothetical; nor did the employer’s counsel in oral argument. 
None of the briefs filed in the case cite any cases either.  That is 
not a surprise since the hypothetical is based on a dubious 
assumption that employees who would engage in this scheming 
have some rather sophisticated knowledge of employment 
discrimination law.277 
The concern applied to a “good faith” standard for making complaints 
should face similar critique.  In addition, in the context of changing the 
standard to “good faith” when assessing reasonable belief that a particular 
incident violated Title VII, there is some additional insurance provided by 
juries evaluating such claims.  The “good faith” standard suggests a sincerity 
of belief that must be evaluated by the factfinder.278  This is not an uncommon 
standard and is in use in multiple areas of law, relying on factfinders to 
 
 276.  Nassar, 131 S. Ct. at 2531-32. 
 277.  Michael J. Zimmer, Hiding the Statute in Plain View: University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 14 Nev. L.J. 705, 720 (2013-14).  We must note here 
as well that there may be a similar critique of our proposal.  We argue that average employees 
do not possess sophisticated legal knowledge to make an accurate determination about 
whether unlawful discrimination has actually occurred.  At the same time, we contend that 
the current retaliation doctrine will directly impact employee behavior and incentivize 
suppression of anger.  How can we reject employee’s knowledge of employment law in one 
context but assume they are aware of retaliation law such that it impacts their behavior?  
However, we do not assume that employees will understand retaliation doctrine from reading 
cases or studying the law, but rather that they will come to understand the extremely limited 
nature of retaliation protection from watching what happens to their friends and colleagues.  
In contrast, it is virtually impossible to gain a clear understanding of the definition of 
actionable discrimination or a hostile work environment from observing a small sampling of 
cases.  The inquiry is typically so fact specific that it is likely that a number of courts presented 
with the same facts will themselves reach different conclusions on the question of actionable 
discrimination. See Gorod, supra note 134, at 1490.  Thus, employee understanding of law is 
reasonable in the retaliation context but not in determining the existence of unlawful 
discrimination. 
 278.  See, e.g., Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 56 Cal. 4th 1113, 1116 (Cal. 2013) 
(concluding that “good faith” is a subjective standard involving a “genuine and honest 
belief.”).  
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determine whether the holder of the “good faith belief” is being honest and 
sincere in describing his or her state of mind.279  Both judges and juries are 
competent at distinguishing trumped up complaints from those based on 
sincere belief, essentially eliminating this imaginary problem of a rise in 
frivolous complaints.280 
CONCLUSION 
There is no shortage of angry workers in the United States and around 
the world.  From reports of angry Starbucks employees who have had their 
hours cut281 to angry workers in Italy’s historic Pompeii site who allegedly 
tore down an ancient wall over a dispute with management282 to an 
assessment by the new UK Jobs Tsar that “[a] feeling among workers that 
they lack control or a voice in the workplace is fuelling ‘misery and anger in 
British society,”283 reports of employees upset over working conditions, loss 
of jobs to lower paid workers, and general discontent abound.  Numerous 
news reports have attributed both the “Brexit” vote and the election of 
Donald Trump to angry working-class individuals who feel left behind by an 
economy that has improved without benefiting them.284  It is in this context 
that we have sought to explore expressions of anger in the workplace and 
 
 279.  Id. (involving good faith belief in the validity of a marriage).  See also Hogan v. New 
York Times Co., 211 F. Supp. 99, 110, (D. Conn. 1962) (involving a libel suit where court 
considered “good faith belief by the defendant in the facts as published”); Bay v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11706, at *50 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 1980) 
(examining defendant’s good faith belief that Plaintiffs were not as qualified as the individuals 
selected because that belief would constitute a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its 
decision). 
 280.  See Gorod, supra note 133, at 1473 (good faith standard “will offer employers some 
protection from retaliation suits based on frivolous complaints without compromising the 
significant goals the retaliation provision can serve.”). 
 281.  Cristina Alesci, Starbucks attempts to appease angry workers, but falls short, CNN 
MONEY (Aug. 4, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/09/news/economy/donald-trump-
bernie-sanders-angry-america/ [https://perma.cc/99CH-LVPH]. 
 282.  Chris Kitching, Angry Pompeii workers ‘tear down part of ancient Roman house in 
clash with management, MIRROR (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-
news/angry-pompeii-workers-tear-down-9734826 [https://perma.cc/8HZA-S4C8]. 
 283.  Robert Booth, Workers’ feelings of powerlessness fuelling anger, says jobs tsar, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/feb/13/workers-
feelings-of-powerlessness-fuelling-anger-says-jobs-tsar [https://perma.cc/MF9T-GL5N]. 
 284.  Jon Swaine, White, working-class and angry: Ohio’s left behind help Trump to 
stunning win, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016
/nov/09/donald-trump-ohio-youngstown-voters [https://perma.cc/8TSB-YQWC]; Andrew 
Higgins, Wigan’s Road to ‘Brexit’: Anger, Loss and Class Resentments, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/world/europe/wigan-england-brexit-working-
class-voters.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/UCB5-PT7J. 
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court-created retaliation doctrines that impact whether and how employees 
feel comfortable speaking up about their discontent.  While the anger 
expressed by working class individuals around the world is not attributed to 
discrimination but to broader societal and economic forces affecting their 
jobs and future prospects, the plight and outspokenness of these workers has 
brought a renewed focus on anger in the workplace that should provide an 
opportunity to rethink existing laws that impact it. 
That workers respond to the perception of discriminatory comments or 
treatment with feelings of anger is understandable.  The recent outpouring of 
allegations of sexual harassment and discrimination by former employees is 
a testament to the fact that these feelings do not easily abate even after an 
employee has made the decision to quit.285  As a result, the important question 
for employers is how to address those emotions while the employee is still 
in the workplace — whether to encourage expression of anger in the form of 
complaints to management or to promote suppression with employees 
keeping silent or venting anger only to their co-workers and others who have 
no power to respond or effect change.  The psychological research 
demonstrates that expression to management in any form whether it be in 
calm and respectful complaints or intense, emotional  outbursts is far 
healthier and more productive for both the worker at issue and the workplace 
overall.  With this knowledge in mind, we propose a rethinking of court-
created retaliation doctrines that discourage such displays of worker anger.  
The “objectively reasonable belief” doctrine protects only those employees 
who complain about conduct that courts would deem to be unlawful 
discrimination while the “manner of the complaint” doctrine validates 
employers who claim “insubordination” as the legitimate non-retaliatory 
reason for discharge any time any employee makes a discrimination 
complaint in an openly angry or emotional manner.  The net impact of these 
doctrines is clear — employees, upon seeing how these doctrines play out 
for their co-workers will (and should) choose to keep silent in the face of 
perceived discrimination.  That choice, in turn, has two distinctly negative 
consequences: (1) the overall goals of Title VII are hindered as fewer 
employees come forward to make complaints and (2) workplace culture and 
worker health and productivity suffer as angry emotions are bottled up.  
While scholars and workers’ advocates have for years highlighted the 
former, our aim in this article is to illuminate the latter consequence and to 
propose changes that benefit both workers and their employers.  While it is 
rare that a proposal to expand workers’ rights and protections also benefits 
employer interests, that is decidedly the case here.  It is time for courts to 
 
 285.  See supra text accompanying notes 1-8. 
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take note of the real-world social consequences of their doctrines and to 
make changes for the benefit of all. 
 
